FOREWORD

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) constitutes both a cause and result of the prevailing insecurity and related phenomena, such as armed conflicts, terrorist activities and transnational organized crime, which jeopardize the development prospects in some countries of the Sahel region. In this context, the definition of effective strategies, tailored to the specificities and needs of the region, requires an in-depth understanding and analysis of the nature, scale, distribution and impact of the circulation of SALW across national borders.

In response to this need and within the framework of the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) and the UNDP Sub Regional Office for the Sahel and West Africa jointly developed an evaluation project on small arms in the Sahel and neighbouring countries with the aim of laying the initial basis for understanding and action in the area of illicit proliferation of SALW.

With funding from Japan, the field research phase of this project took place from September 2015 to February 2016, including the organization of a regional validation workshop. This study focused on nine countries, namely Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Senegal and Chad. I would like to seize this opportunity to express our gratitude to all financial and technical partners, in particular the UNDP Regional Office for the Sahel and West Africa, the Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (GRIP) and Small Arms Survey (SAS). UNREC also takes this opportunity to thank those partners who, through their various contributions, have helped the initiatives undertaken by African Union (AU) Member States on arms control and limitation, as clearly stated in resolution AHG/Res. 138 (XXI) adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its 21st Ordinary Session (Addis Ababa, 16 to 20 July 1985).

The manifest will of the Heads of State and Government to work towards this goal was formalized by the establishment of UNREC in Lomé, Togo, pursuant to resolution 40/151 adopted on 16 December 1985 by the United Nations General Assembly. The latter entrusted the Center with the mandate to provide Member States of the African region, at their request, with technical and substantive support for their initiatives in the field of peacebuilding, arms control and disarmament as well as security sector reform.

At the regional level, the Center carries out in-depth studies with the aim of promoting peace, disarmament and development on the continent. This report presents a synthesis of the results of the various national reports produced by the consultants in each country where the survey took place.

Olatokunbo Ige,
UNREC Director
Acknowledgments

This report was jointly prepared by the Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (GRIP) and the Small Arms Survey (SAS), which jointly designed and managed the project. A first version of this report was distributed at the Lome workshop organized by UNREC and UNDP in February 2016. The core project team included Botre Alain, Programme Officer at UNREC, Cédric Poitevin (GRIP), Claudia Seymour and Anna Alvazzi Del Frate (SAS). Inputs were provided by Khristopher Carlson and Mihaela Racovita (SAS) and Christophe Stiernon (GRIP). The experts who carried out the field missions to the nine target countries of this study were Jihan Seniorea, Akogla Kossi, Charles Nasibu Bilali, Alphonse Muleefu, Jasmin Poboric, Claudio Gramizzi, An Vranckx, Hamadou Ouedraogo and Cédric Poitevin.

GRIP

GRIP is an independent research center based in Brussels, specialized in controlling transfers of arms and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, as well as issues related to security and governance in sub-Saharan Africa.

Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey is an independent research Program located within the Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. It is the main source of International public information on all aspects of small arms and armed violence, and makes its resources available to governments, policy makers, researchers and militants.
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Introduction

Armed conflict, organized crime and terrorism can all contribute to the weakening of States’ authority and control over illicit small arms. In addition to the loss of lives\(^1\), armed violence has a long-term negative impact on national social and economic development\(^2\) and undermines States’ ability to provide security and implement the rule of law\(^3\). A central enabler of armed violence is the availability of illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW)\(^4\).

Expanding upon existing knowledge regarding illicit SALWs globally is a major challenge; data on quantities, types and values is scarce, yet measuring and monitoring the values and volumes of illicit SALWs flow can provide important baselines of information to combat illicit SALW proliferation at national, regional and global levels, making contribute to on-going peace and development initiatives.

Reducing illicit SALW proliferation at the global level is a goal identified within the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) 2030. Goal 16 of the SDG focuses on the promotion of peaceful societies, access to justice and effective governmental institutions. Within Goal 16, target 16.4 calls for significant reduction of illicit financial flows and arms trafficking\(^5\). Within the Sahel region of Africa, SDG 16 is particularly relevant in light of recent episodes of armed conflict, armed violence and cross-border movement of illicit SALW.

Understanding how best to curb current patterns of SALW proliferation within the Sahel region requires knowledge around States’ capacities to activities to control SALW. One tool to assess States’ needs to better control SALW and assist in their design and implementation of SALW control initiatives is through surveys on SALW and collect both quantitative and qualitative information.

This report highlights findings from the project «Assessment Survey on Small Arms in the Sahel Region and Neighbouring countries,» and examines the state of SALW circulation in nine countries (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Senegal and Chad). It explores initiatives and control measures at State levels aimed at preventing and reducing the proliferation of SALW and ammunition. Overall, this project is composed of three main components: a preliminary literature review of Sahel region SALW control and proliferation, consultations with national and regional actors involved in Sahel region SALW control, and a seminar with national and regional actors to validate and provide inputs into this report.

Among the aims of this report is to highlight national and regional trends in uncontrolled circulation of SALW and ammunition. Further, it captures the current general challenges that these nine countries are experiencing in controlling SALW. It presents a closer look

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at each country by identifying specific issues relevant for that State. In addition, the report highlights progress of key initiatives and control measures adopted by these nine states in fourteen thematic areas, and identifies best practices, lessons learned, and continued challenges at national and regional levels. Finally, this report presents the overall conclusion of the study. The appendix of the report contains the data collection tool used for this study.

1. The project

The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) and the Sub-regional Office of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) for Western and Central Africa provide support to States within the Sahel, Central and Western Africa regions to strengthen SALW control mechanisms and curb the proliferation of SALW. To assist with the collection of information to inform future programming and SALW control action, UNREC and UNDP commissioned the Small Arms Survey and the Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (GRIP) to conduct national assessments on SALW in the Sahel and neighbouring countries.

The project was implemented over a six-month period, from August 2015 to January 2016.

Dakar Sub-Regional Platform (SRP) of the UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa

The Dakar Sub-Regional Platform (SRP) is a component of the UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Its main function is to promote organizational efficiency through the provision of integrated programmatic and strategic support services through country offices. The UNDP Sub-Regional Platform provides services to 24 UNDP offices in Western and Central Africa. It also supports the efforts of Regional Organizations and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in West and Central Africa. Further, it provides services for the elaboration of programs and policies, technical assistance as well as a number of other areas, including:

- Assistance in the design process and drafting of the Common Country Assessment and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP);
- The description review / Country Programme Action Plan;
- The review and provision of contributions to National Development Strategies;
- The management and execution of Regional projects of the UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA);
- The hosting of the United Nations Development Group Secretariat (UNDG) for West and Central Africa, officially known as the Regional Directors’ Team (RDT);
- The facilitation role in identifying skills for strengthening operations and management of the country offices.

6. The 24 UNDP country offices in West and Central Africa are based in the following countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Chad and Togo.
UNREC

UNREC is the only regional entity of the United Nations specialized in disarmament and non-proliferation in Africa. Its main function is to support UN Member States in conveying decisions, instruments and commitments on disarmament and non-proliferation actions at the national, sub-regional and regional levels.

Due to the specific nature of security issues in Africa, UNREC emphasizes activities related to illicit SALW trafficking and support to Member States to fulfill regional and international disarmament and non-proliferation commitments.

2. Objectives of the Project

The Project on “Assessment survey on Small Arms in the Sahel region and neighbouring countries” has several main objectives:

• To assess regional trends in the circulation and the proliferation of SALW and ammunition in the nine countries surveyed and highlight similarities and differences among States;

• To analyze recent and current initiatives and control measures taken by governments and note the impact of these initiatives; and,

• To highlight best practices, lessons learned and challenges.

3. Methodology

The methodology developed by Small Arms Survey and GRIP was structured around

• A preliminary literature review for each of the countries surveyed;

• An information collection tool; and

• A fact-finding mission in each of the countries surveyed.

I. Desk studies

For each country, the Small Arms Survey and GRIP reviewed available information and publications on SALW and ammunition trafficking and proliferation as well as regional initiatives and control-measure activities taken up by States.. To this effect, the Small Arms Survey and GRIP followed the existing best practices, including the 05.10 module on International Standards on Small Arms Control (ISACS - International Standards on Small Arms) entitled “Conducting small arms and light weapons surveys”.

The desk studies included:

• Existing publications and unpublished work of Small Arms Survey and GRIP;

• UN reports on SALW circulation at the national, regional and international levels (including reports of the Secretary-General, Expert Panels and other relevant UN agencies);

• International and national reports on SALW circulation at the national, regional and international levels;

• Specific reports and studies on SALW proliferation in the nine countries surveyed, including reports on control measures (for instance, national reports on the implementation of the UN Programme of Action on SALW (UNPoA), and national action plans and legislation); and

• Relevant media articles and reports (local and international).

Based on the literature review, the Small Arms Survey and GRIP drafted a preliminary report summarizing the literature review which provided:

• A contextual analysis of the security situation in connection with SALW proliferation in the target country;

• Interpretation of existing quantitative data on SALW proliferation and control;

• A review of existing SALW control mechanisms;

• Information on public perceptions of security;

• An identification of major gaps in current literature covering the thematic and geographic areas of concern; and

• A list of people and institutions actively engaged in the fight against the proliferation of SALW, including government bodies, civil society, international partners, regional and international and organizations in order to facilitate field work and identify critical points of contact to fulfil the objectives of this work.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes studied</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. National Institutions</td>
<td>2. Legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Conservation of Data</td>
<td>6. Tracing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. DDR Program and recovery of arms</td>
<td>14. Cooperation and assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**II. Data collection tool**

Small Arms Survey and GRIP established a data-collection toolkit to guide consultants conducting field-data collection. The toolkit consisted of five components:

• Instrument 1: Summary of literature review

• Instrument 2: List of key stakeholders in country for KIIs

• Instrument 3: Interview guide for key stakeholders

• Instrument 4: Validation workshop guidelines for in-country workshop
• Instrument 5: Drafting guidelines for country reports

The interview guide/questionnaire (see Appendix I), was designed to ensure the collection of comprehensive information for each country visited and promote consistency in data collection and reporting among individual country missions. This guide consisted of questions specific to SALW proliferation and national implementation of the UN PoA, the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), the UN Protocol on Firearms, and where relevant, the ECOWAS and ECCAS Conventions on SALW control. The questionnaire was designed to capture information on gaps and national capacity challenges regarding implementation of the above mentioned SALW control instruments.

The questionnaire covered 12 sections:

• **Overview of the situation of SALW** - What are the key issues related to the proliferation of arms in the country? What is the main source of illicit SALW? Etc.

• **National institutions and laws** – Has the state created a NFP or a National Commission to fight the proliferation of small arms? Has a National Action Plan been adopted and is it implemented? Has the state adopted national legislation on small arms and defined criminal offenses in line with regional and international SALW control instruments?

• **Production of SALW, marking and maintenance of data** - Has the state adopted controls on the production of small arms? Has the state proceeded in marking small arms in accordance with its commitments in this regard, for instance at the time of manufacture, import, or transfer to civilians? Does the State have data on small arms including manufactured weapons State-owned SALW and transfers?

• **Tracing** – Has the state developed practices for international cooperation in tracing seized or recovered small arms? Does the state collaborate with INTERPOL?

• **International transfers and brokerage** – Has the State developed the controls on International transfers like import, export, transit and transshipment? Has the State developed brokering controls, notably the registration and / or the granting of licenses for brokering activities?

• **Management of Stockpiles** - Has the State put in place an adequate inventory management system to ensure safety and prevent diversion? Has the State developed practices of identification and disposal of surplus small arms?

• **Civilian Possession of arms** – What is the proportion of households who own firearms? What are the reasons for the possession and the acquisition of arms?

• **Cross-border flows** - What are the main points of passage of arms in the country or outside the country? What are the traffic methods known? What type of arms are they?

• **Awareness-raising Campaigns** – Has the State conducted awareness-raising campaigns to highlight the problems caused by traffic and illegal possession? Have they proceeded to amnesties or collection programs?

• **International Cooperation and assistance** - Is the state involved in regional and international cooperation and has it benefitted from assistance programs with regards to SALW?

• **Border control** - Is the state involved in specific monitoring programs of borders, such as cooperation with neighboring countries?
• Comments and Recommendations

Once completed by the Small Arms Survey and GRIP the data collection tool was submitted to consultants to allow them to prepare their fact-finding missions.

III. Fact-Finding missions

Fact-finding missions were conducted by consultants with expertise in research methodologies and SALW control issues. Field missions, ranging from 12 to 16 days in length, were completed between September and November 2015.

With the exception of Burkina Faso and Central African Republic, all field missions were followed by validation workshop to bring stakeholders together who participated in the project. For these workshops, consultants presented their preliminary findings from interviews, reports and available quantitative information on SALW for the country in which the workshop was held. Workshops allowed for validation of the information collected and – through group discussion and stakeholder input – provided consultants with additional nuanced information on SALW control and proliferation.

IV. Limitations

This study was conducted within specific time and budgetary provisions. In some countries it was possible to obtain only limited access to government officials and official records and reporting on SALW.

I. Illicit circulation and proliferation of small arms and light weapons

Surveys made in each country and the analysis of all reports helped in the identification of sub-regional and regional trends with regards to SALW circulation and proliferation. Beyond the characteristics of each of the countries surveyed and despite the limited detailed facts and figures available, the first section of this chapter highlights a number of common characteristics relevant in the following areas:

• Armed violence;
• Arms in circulation;
• The production and circulation of arms and home-made ammunition;
• Industrial production of arms and ammunition;
• Routes and recent trafficking dynamics; and
• The link between arms and crime.

It also contains tables with estimates backed up by figures for each country on the basis of data available for:

• Violent deaths and homicides by firearms;
• The prices and types of illicit arms and ammunition; and
• Information on seized arms.

The second section of this chapter provides the reader with a summary of the circulation and proliferation of arms in each of the nine countries of the study: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal.

8. The workshop did not take place in two countries. In Burkina Faso, the holding of the workshop was planned but had to be cancelled because of the Coup d’État led by members of the Presidential Security Regiment which paralyzed state institutions for several days. In Central African Republic, the workshop did not place due to coordination difficulties with the local office of the United Nations Development Programme, originally identified as the partner to facilitate the organization of the workshop.
1. Major regional and sub-regional trends

I. Rare and difficult to access data

Collecting detailed facts and figures regarding illicit SALW is difficult to do anywhere in the world and locating existing information in this area for the Sahel and neighboring states proved to be no exception to this. Generally, the study collected a relatively small number of estimates on illicit SALW proliferation. Several factors explain this challenge. In some cases data does not exist or is unknown to government officials. In other cases, data are not centralized and, hence, not easily located by government officials, and data is available it can often be unstructured difficult to draw clear conclusions from. Additionally, in some cases government officials do not want to share figures or are otherwise not authorized to do so. Therefore, the knowledge that state or non-state actors have of the proliferation of arms in their country is largely based on a rough general appreciation of the situation of arms.

Without complete data on SALW proliferation, it is difficult to present a clear picture of its dynamics at a national level, much less provide a comparison between States. Doing so would require the implementation of a much more rigorous survey exercise to provide reliable estimates. Without the time and resources to conduct the type of survey required, this project was able to generate an acceptable methodology in order to gather and compile existing data and estimates, including from official sources.

Although this study has confirmed the scarcity of available data on illegal arms in the Sahel region, the figures collected and presented here support the need for future implementation of a study to collect more reliable SALW data per country, including illicit SALW proliferation. With this type of undertaking, such data could represent a direct and tangible contribution to the SDG target 16.4 aimed at reducing illicit arms flows.

II. Armed Violence

Data on armed violence are very crucial in measuring the progress with regards to development. According to the report Global Burden of Armed Violence (GBAV) 2015 produced by the Secretariat of the Geneva Declaration, firearms are used in 46.3% of homicides committed worldwide and 44.1% of all violent deaths, which represents annually an average of approximately 197,000 deaths between 2007 and 2012. The death of a person in a violent manner, regardless of the context in which it occurred, (or “violent death”) is a composite indicator combining several broad analytical categories of data such as “deaths directly linked to conflict”, “Intentional” and “unintentional” homicide and “deaths which occur during legal interventions.” The multi-source data base used for the GBAV report currently combines statistics of homicides for 201 countries and territories from a wide range of international, regional, national, and sub-national sources. The statistics on homicides are integrated with the number of conflict-related deaths in countries with armed conflicts presently or already over, or in cases of severe political instability and / or experiencing levels of important political violence. Data is collected with a set of metadata in order to save their methodological characteristics and sources.

Table 1 comprises of the GBAV estimates for the period 2007 to 2012 as well as those of the Institute for Health Metrics and the 2010 survey for the nine countries surveyed in the framework of this study.

10. See «Every Body Counts: Measuring Violent Deaths ».
11. The two sources provide different statistics for many countries, as can be seen in Table 1. In both cases it shows estimates based on different parameters.
### Table I: Violent deaths and homicides through firearms

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>306 violent deaths (3.6 / 100 000)</td>
<td>278 homicides through firearms</td>
<td>Burkina Faso has records of the type of armed violence. For instance, in the 2013 data, information is available according to regions, the number of attacks, weapons used as well as items stolen. Check national report in the appendix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>707 violent deaths (3.5 / 100 000)</td>
<td>278 homicides through firearms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>1014 violent deaths (23.8 / 100 000)</td>
<td>214 homicides through firearms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1481 violent deaths (13.3 / 100 000)</td>
<td>186 homicides through firearms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1145 violent deaths (8.5 / 100 000)</td>
<td>238 homicides through firearms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>273 violent deaths (7.8 / 100 000)</td>
<td>55 homicides through firearms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>567 violent deaths (3.6 / 100 000)</td>
<td>199 homicides through firearms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>3496 violent deaths (2.2 / 100 000)</td>
<td>4659 homicides through firearms¹⁴</td>
<td>A national survey is currently underway and will provide updated and relevant information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>512 violent deaths (4.1 / 100 000)</td>
<td>81 homicides through firearms</td>
<td>According to the armed violence Indicators of the UNODC, armed violence, the homicide rate in Senegal was 2.3 per 100 000 inhabitants in 2012 and 0.2 per 100 000 inhabitants in 2013¹⁵.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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12. The interactive card is available on the website of the Geneva Declaration.
13. Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 2010, as shown in the GBAV 2015.
14. See GBV 2015 Methodological Annexe for a thorough discussion of the sources used for these data, as well as its limits.
The perception of safety by civilians is an important research question directly related to the impact of armed violence. However, the study did not include the application of this project.

**III. Circulation of arms**

In all countries surveyed, there is no public data concerning legal firearms in the hands of government forces or civilians. This is also true for illegal arms.

The only figures currently available come from studies and estimates made by research centers such as the Small Arms Survey, or by other researchers or institutions. During this study, estimates were made by national partners without support of verifiable documentation.

**Arms held by government forces**

Arms holdings proved difficult. Therefore, the available estimates for Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Mali, Niger and Senegal date back to 2006. Data from 2008 is available for Mauritania while data for Nigeria is available from 2006 and 2012. In only one of the nine countries, recent figures were gathered, and by an external body: in CAR, the inventory conducted by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and its partners Halo Trust helped in establishing that the Central African armed forces have in their possession 3,000 weapons, of which only about 300 are functional.

The administrative culture seems to be the primary reason for the unavailability of figures, in several countries. Some people, even within the government, have...
doubts that the authorities hold precise figures on the subject (for instance, Niger).

**Civilian possession of arms**

Few official figures are publicly available on firearms held legally by civilians in the nine countries. All the countries surveyed report having a system in place for record keeping on civilian firearms, but these records are rarely centralized and often unreliable (see chapter II, section “conservation of data”).

However, there are external sources that allow for some insight into civilian firearms holdings, but estimates are dated for similar to government holdings.

The Small Arms Survey compiled in 2007 data for each of the nine countries but the situations in a number of Sahel and neighboring states has changed significantly since 2011 and provide only cursory information concerning what the current status of civilian arms may look like now.

During field missions, government representatives recognized that in several countries (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mauritania, Senegal, and Chad) the number of firearms legally possessed by civilians represents a small percentage of the total number of arms in circulation nationally. It is estimated that most civilian firearms are possessed illegally. It was speculated that ordinary citizens are not aware of current regulations on firearms or have not taken the trouble to comply with them (see chapter II, section “Civilian Possession of arms”). Consequently, the illicit nature of a weapon does not automatically mean that it poses an immediate danger or is likely to be used for criminal purposes.

In all the countries surveyed, three primary reasons were given as to why people possess firearms: 1) hunting, 2) self-defense and protection of property, and 3) for traditional ceremonies. In Mauritania the demand for arms by civilians can also be explained by the practice of target shooting which is a national sport.

Four trends characterize the means through which civilians acquire firearms. The first involves legal purchase from registered dealers (e.g. Cameroon and Senegal) or from a foreign dealer (e.g., Niger). In Niger, transactions of foreign-made firearms are common and fall within current legal provisions. The second source for civilian acquisition is through purchase of artisanal or craft-made firearms that are locally produced or accessible from other artisanal producers in the region. This is particularly the case in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, and Nigeria. With the exception of Burkina Faso, such transactions are for the most part unregulated, and as such, unregistered. As a third source, civilians have access to black market firearms and this is true for all nine countries with varying degrees of prevalence. A fourth method of civilian acquisition is through donation in the form of a gift.

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23. There is no single scientific technique that would allow to say with certainty the total number of firearms held by civilians. Country information on the Small Arms Survey were collected in using several sources and methods. Whenever this was possible, these data were drawn from the official sources and independent estimates were used for a better comprehension. Official statistics on firearms registration are the most reliable source, but they only reflect just a part of the real. Where neither the information on the registration of firearms nor independent assessments are available, estimates are based on a correlative statistics analysis. The strongest sources are subject to the greatest possible use, less reliable methods which are introduced only where necessary to ensure obtaining a good result.
by inheritance. In this case, such transactions are most often in violation of the national regulations (e.g., in Cameroon and Senegal).

**Price of arms and ammunition in circulation**

The price of illicit firearms and their relationship with the security dynamics are elements of importance to help understand local security, the demand and supply of arms, and the potential correlations between the prices of ammunition and occurrence of violence. Recent research has demonstrated that the price of arms and ammunition rises in periods of high insecurity, most often attributable to rising demand\(^{24}\).

However, interpreting price fluctuations can be difficult when they involve different locations and periods of time. Therefore, it is often difficult to compare how price changes in one country may relate to price changes in a neighboring state. Despite these limitations, a better knowledge of prices and types of arms and ammunition in illicit circulation may provide valuable insight where the movement of arms smuggling markets are of concern.

**Table IV: Price and types of illegal arms and ammunition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>«Kalashnikov»</td>
<td>150 000 CFA</td>
<td>GRIP Interviews, September 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Assault rifle</td>
<td>400 000 CFA in the Far North</td>
<td>GRIP Interviews, October 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35 000 CFA (in border regions, border with CAR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK rifle type</td>
<td>25.000-50.000 CFA</td>
<td>80 000-150 000 CFA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic pistol</td>
<td>25.000 CFA</td>
<td>200 000 CFA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home-made guns</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>45 000 CFA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand Grenade (manufactured in France)</td>
<td>500 CFA</td>
<td>2.500 CFA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand Grenade (manufactured in China)</td>
<td>250 CFA</td>
<td>1500 CFA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,62x39mm ammunition</td>
<td>100 CFA / bullet</td>
<td>300 CFA / bullet</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>Price Range (CFA)</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Automatic weapon (AK 47)</td>
<td>150 000-300 000 CFA</td>
<td>Interviews, October 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>150 000-500 000 CFA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shotgun</td>
<td>150 000-300 000 CFA</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Handgun, pistol</td>
<td>New: 30-650 000 CFA</td>
<td>Interviews, November 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Used: 15-45 000 CFA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shotgun</td>
<td>New: 70-150 000 CFA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Used: 25-100 000 CFA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cartridge (per unit)</td>
<td>200-400 CFA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV. Manufacture and circulation of home-made arms and ammunition

Data sources on artisanal firearms production are scarce and vary across the nine countries visited. In Burkina Faso, the Government has created an association of manufacturers which can provide the government with some idea of production levels of artisanal firearms. This puts the Government in the position to know the volume of firearms produced, and allows it to more realistically assess the existing challenges related to this type of production. A similar initiative was carried out in Mali (2008) by the National Commission, but follow-up to that work has not taken place and current estimates of artisanal firearms are unknown, particularly in light of more recent security concerns and conflict. In Cameroon and Nigeria, independent studies are currently underway to better understand the phenomenon of artisanal firearms and ammunition production\(^\text{27}\). There is no information on similar initiatives in Mauritania, Niger, Central African Republic, Senegal or Chad.

Despite the lack of comparable information between the nine countries surveyed, it is possible to present the main trends on this subject based on research and interviews with national stakeholders in each country. Thus, it appears that artisanal production of guns is a long-established phenomenon in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Nigeria, and CAR. In Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali and Nigeria, information shows that production is limited to certain areas of the country. In Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Chad, it appears that artisanal production is more modest than in the other countries under survey.

In eight of the nine countries under survey (excluding Nigeria), stakeholder interviews indicate that the level of craft production of firearms and ammunition is either stable or in decline, which may explain an increase in availability of industrial-manufactured firearms among most of the nine states. In Nigeria, artisanal production is reported to be increasing. This production in Nigeria is more diverse and sophisticated (weapons and hunting cartridges of one or several shots, pistols and revolvers, 7.62mm ammunition, etc.) than in other countries, where production is reportedly limited to powder or single shot guns using 12mm hunting cartridges.

In all countries under survey, two main factors driving demand for artisanal firearms emerged from field missions: traditional ceremonies and hunting. However it was also reported that in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali and Nigeria, these arms are believed to be commonly used for local crimes, while in Mali, Nigeria and CAR non-state armed groups are the main users of artisanal firearms. Further, in Nigeria, terrorist groups are also suspected of using this classification of weaponry.

Finally, stakeholder interviews point out a cross-border element to the trade in artisanal firearms. Weapons produced in Nigeria, for example, are of high quality and sophisticated and circulate in Cameroon in significant numbers. Interviews conducted in Mauritania showed identical trends of weapons from Mali.

V. Industrial production of arms and ammunition

Four of the nine countries have facilities to manufacture either industrial-grade weaponry or ammunition. Nigeria – the only country with industrial capacity to produce both arms and ammunition – is home to the DICON company (Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria), which operates under the Ministry of Defence. It produces a wide range of arms and ammunition (including automatic rifles, machine gunner pistols, machine guns, pistols, rocket launchers, hand grenades, ammunition of 9mm X19, 7.62mm X51, 7.62mm and X51, 81mm mortar)\(^\text{28}\). It appears from interviews in Nigeria that DICON's capacity to produce armaments does not entirely meet the needs of Nigerian security forces, that are additionally met with imported weapons and ammunition.

\(^{27}\) In Cameroon, this survey was conducted by the GRIP and in Nigeria it was drawn from a study of the Small Arms Survey.

\(^{28}\) Website of DICON.
VI. Trafficking movements: recent routes and dynamics

More information is needed concerning trafficking routes and cross-border trade. Within the nine countries, stakeholders did provide some perspective of national trends in trafficking of firearms and the details of these dynamics varied considerably from one country to the next. That said, credit is due to a number of state authorities who presented this study with statistics of recent weapons seizures in their respective countries (see Table V below).

However, due to a general lack of data, it is difficult to map the major trends in trafficking among the nine states. However, there are some noteworthy elements.

With the exception of Senegal, the countries of this study noted that the proliferation of illegal arms originate mostly from outside the country through organized or small-scale trafficking networks. This is in contrast to the diversion of weapons from government stockpiles which is of most concern in Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria, Central African Republic and Chad where armed conflict is, or has recently been, an issue.

In several Sahel region countries, stakeholders emphasized the collapse of Libya directly impacting security and illicit arms flows. In this regard, more work needs to be done to trace weapons and ammunition flowing out of Libya.

In Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Niger, government stakeholders stressed that cross-border trafficking over land routes is well-known but difficult to control (see Chapter II «Border Management» section). Respondents in Cameroon, Mali, Senegal and Chad tended to have information concerning illicit arms flows into their countries, but were less clear regarding illicit trade routes exiting their countries. In any case, the occurrence of active armed conflict exacerbated challenges regarding the control of cross-border illicit arms flows.

**Weapons seized**

The collection and monitoring of weapons seizures data can provide important qualitative information on the evolution of illicit arms markets and trade. Although there are limitations on the usefulness of raw data on seizures, such information - provided it is disaggregated by weapons type and situational description of the seizure29 – can be useful to determine recent and emergent patterns in illicit trading. At present, the states participating in this study lack rigorous data collection capacity on seizures and need to develop methods to manage what data does exist.

Official data on seizures was made available for only Burkina Faso and Niger (UNODC, 2015). Some information was collected on CAR and Nigeria. Recognizing that information on seizures is scare, available data in this regard is presented below.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Purpose and quantity seized</th>
<th>Entry Details</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>Based on the interviews of GRIP with UNMAS, September 2015</td>
<td>GRIP Interview UNPOL / MINUSCA, September 2015</td>
<td></td>
<td>Some weapons seized were added to the reserves of the State, following losses related to the 2012-2013 crisis, as well as a response to the UN embargo in 2013 (GRIP interviews, September 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some weapons seized were added to the reserves of the State, following losses related to the 2012-2013 crisis, as well as a response to the UN embargo in 2013 (GRIP interviews, September 2015)</td>
<td>GRIP Interview UNPOL / MINUSCA, September 2015</td>
<td></td>
<td>According to sources interviewed in 2015, 3000 arms and 500000 ammunition were seized by MISCA, MINUSCA and the Sangaris contingent whereas the reports of seized arms by UNPOL / MINUSCA count 47 arms, 1576 ammunition, 19 Hand grenades in Bangui between October 2014 and August 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>No information available</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>No information available</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>UNPOL and Conflict Armament Research provided equipment to the CNLPAL for registration and tracing of seized weapons (interviews, November 2015)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>No information available</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### VII. Arms and crime

Armed crime is a major concern for all nine countries. In Senegal and Cameroon, criminal activity with firearms is more rare than with other non-firearm weapons types such as knives. In Burkina Faso and Cameroon, stakeholders report that the majority of crimes where firearms are involved are done with artisanal weapons. A general lack of crime statistics within the nine countries of this study prevents in-depth understanding of firearms use in criminal activity, highlighting the need for standardized data collection on crime in effort to combat it.

### 2. Overview of the situation country by country

This section presents the main findings of the survey within each country. Each country summary contains information from the literature review as well as field missions.

#### I. Burkina Faso

The situation of illicit SALW proliferation in Burkina Faso is considered less problematic than in other countries of the region plagued by high levels of armed violence. Nevertheless, there is a growing sense of insecurity among the general population due to an increase in armed crime in the last decade. The country has gone through several crises, the last one in 2011, contributing to the proliferation of weapons in the country.

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30. Estimates of the Burkinabe authorities are confirmed by a recent study by UNODC on firearms which says that in 2013, 44.8% of the weapons seized are «rudimentary» (that is to say, home-made) against 41.2% of arms of Kalashnikov type. See UNODC. 2015. Country Fact Sheets: Summary data from one country responses firearms seizures and trafficking.
Illicit weapons in Burkina Faso come from both internal and external sources. Internally, illicit arms come from military arsenals, the civilian market or local craft production. Significant quantities of weapons were diverted from government stockpiles in 2011 following military and police mutiny\textsuperscript{31}. The total number of weapons diverted in 2011 is unknown, in large part because of poor management of government weapons prior to the insurrection. The more recent estimates of government holdings (from 2006 and 2007) list 20,520 military weapons and 18,493 with the police and gendarmerie\textsuperscript{32}.

Burkina Faso maintains that it controls the manufacture and sale of arms, in addition to regulating civilian ownership. According to a 2014 census, the country has 116 licensed local dealers and manufacturers.

Concerns of illegal artisanal gun manufacturing includes poor documentation of their operations. According to a recent study by the UNODC\textsuperscript{33}, close to half of all weapons seized in 2013 were artisanal weapons, demonstrating the significance of the industry in Burkina Faso.

Civilian ownership is also poorly understood. According to government authorities, 5,559 permits to purchase weapons were issued to civilians between 2012 and 2014.. SAS estimated 148,000 the total number of SALW in 2007 (both legal and illegal) in the hands of civilians\textsuperscript{34}.

Externally, the security situation in the sub-region deteriorated significantly in the last five years. The collapse of Libya and subsequent regional dispersal of its stockpiles, in addition to the crises in Mali and Côte d’Ivoire all contributed to the illicit trafficking and proliferation of arms into Burkina Faso.

Burkina Faso is reportedly an important transit point for regional illicit weapons trafficking\textsuperscript{35}. Further, several recent cases allege the involvement of Burkinabe nationals in weapons trading embezzlement. Burkina Faso has been mentioned several times UN sanctions committee reports concerning its involvement in arms embargo violations in relation to Côte d’Ivoire\textsuperscript{36}.

\textsuperscript{31.} Luntumbue, Mémier Michel and Marc. 2012. Conflict Systems and security issues in West Africa. Gorée Institute / GRIP
\textsuperscript{32.} The data is not available on the SAS site but can be found on gunpolicy.org. The original study was made by Aaron Karp, « Le ruisseau et le torrent: les stocks étatiques » directory on SALW in 2006, July 1, 2006.
\textsuperscript{33.} UNODC, «Country Fact Sheets: Summary data from country responses on firearms seizures and trafficking» 2015.
\textsuperscript{34.} Aaron Karp, «Completing the Count: Civilian firearms - Annexe4 online,» Small Arms Survey 2007,
\textsuperscript{36.} The involvement of Burkina Faso has also been demonstrated in connection with violations made to other embargoes in the subregion in 1990 and 2000. It has therefore equipped the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone and the Liberian Government then headed by Charles Taylor with weapons. See Berghezan, George. 2013.
II. Cameroon

The survey failed to obtain sufficient quantitative information on the proliferation of arms in Cameroon. However, numerous interviews done during the fact-finding mission allowed to sketch the main trends in this area and key actor perceptions.

According to government stakeholder input for this work, the number of legally owned weapons is considered to be relatively small compared to total firearms in the country. Within the population, the main reasons of arming themselves today are for hunting and self-defense.

According to 2007 estimates Cameroon has 2.8 firearms per 100 people, totaling approximately 340,000 weapons in civilian possession\[37\]. The total number of firearms nationwide was estimated at 370,000 in 2007\[38\], with 32,918 to 54,863 with the armed forces and 24,607 with the police\[39\].

Comprehensive crime statistics are not available in Cameroon. Of the available data, voluntary manslaughter rates in 2012 amounted to 7.8 per 100,000 people (1654 voluntary manslaughter per year), making it one of the lowest in the sub-region\[40\].

Internal and external factors contribute to firearms proliferation in the country. Internally, artisanal weapons are of the greatest concern in some regions\[41\]. These weapons are reportedly used for funeral rites and hunting. However, in the absence of regulations on craft production of weapons, when used to commit crimes it is impossible to trace their chains-of-custody. Furthermore, it is believed that most crime conducted with firearms is done with craft-produced firearms. Externally, porous borders are to blame for the proliferation of illegal firearms in the country. In CAR and Chad, the shortcomings of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes have resulted in illicit weapons trading. Furthermore, the lack of adequate control of government stockpiles is another factor for illicit proliferation.

Firearms from neighboring countries are considered the main source of illicit weapons in Cameroon, including both industrial and craft-produced firearms, with home-made firearms coming mostly from Nigeria. The main trafficking routes into Cameroon are believed to be:

- Routes from Chad (and possibly Libya and Mali) to Nigeria into the north of Cameroon.
- From South Sudan via Chad and Nigeria;
- From CAR to Cameroon and Nigeria; and

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38. These estimates are part of a global study and the figures advanced are extrapolations based on the arms possession rate in other countries considered similar to Cameroon. It is not a matter of figures established on the basis of a specific survey in the country
39. Annex II can be downloaded on an Excel spreadsheet only on the website of GunPolicy.org, under the name Global Military Law Enforcement Firearm Stockpiles.
40. United Nations Office against Drugs and Crime, Global Study on Homicide 2013: Trends, Context, Data, April 10, 2014, p. 123. Voluntary manslaughter rates in other countries of the subregion was in 2012, 10.0 per 100,000 people in Angola, 19.3 in Equitorial Guinea, 9.1 in Gabon, 11.8 in Central African Republic, 28.3 in Democratic Republic of Congo and 7.3 in Chad.
41. The manufacture of home-made weapons is relatively developed in three regions in Cameroon: the western, south-western and north-western region. These weapons are generally made by blacksmiths of which represents a minor part of their activities. They require between one or two weeks of work and are sold 70,000 FCFA per unit. These same blacksmiths also manufacture ammunition.
• Land and sea movements from the Nigerian border between the two countries (especially in the Southwest).

These trafficking corridors existed prior to the current crisis the country and remain active today.

The security situation in the regions of the North and Far North have deteriorated due to Boko Haram since 2012. Before then, weapons passed into the country to criminals and to support armed groups in Nigeria. The declaration of war on Boko Haram by the Government of Cameroon in May 2014 somewhat changed this dynamic. The Cameroonian territory has become a destination in itself for weapons from neighbouring countries and broadly from the Sahelian zone whilst trafficking networks have adapted their methods in the Far North and in the Adamawa regions. The nature of weapons trafficked in these regions is very diverse. Authorities frequently seize rocket launchers, grenades and explosives in large quantities and other equipment including tanks and military uniforms.

A military style rifle sells in the black market in the Far North at a relatively high price (about 400,000 CFA). This might imply that, despite increased proliferation in the northern part of Cameroon, weapons are specifically requested and that their access is limited to groups or individuals that dispose of significant financial resources. In the East, firearms proliferation increased in 2013 after the fall of President Bozizi in Central African Republic. Although the Cameroonian authorities have conducted operations to disarm people and groups entering the country, the proliferation of weapons has increased in the region and insecurity is on the rise. Illustrating this development, it is now possible to purchase a firearm at 35,000 CFA in the East (significantly less than the average price of a craft-produced weapons in other regions and less than ten times the price for weapons of war in the Far North).

The government holds limited capacity to manufacture military ammunition (7.62 caliber) and hunting weapons. These are manufactured by MANUCAM, a factory located in Garoua (North).

There are no known cases of large-scale diversion of weapons and ammunition from government stockpiles. Small-scale diversion by loss or theft seems to take place from time to time as it tends to indicate the presence of weapons and ammunition in crime scenes previously belonging to the armed forces and order. It seems like these practices are limited especially because of sanctions. People possessing, selling or buying illegal weapons or ammunition are in theory to be brought before a military court.

Cameroon is also increasingly affected by organized armed poaching of wildlife by individuals and groups armed with military style firearms. Poachers include both subsistence hunters and armed groups, hunting both bush meat and killing for ivory. The increase in poaching is accompanied by a tacit complicity, and in some cases active participation of government officials.

Cameroon's geographical location makes it an important point for trafficking by sea. Illicit trafficking to Cameroon includes SALW and ammunition in route to countries such as Chad and CAR.

The Panel of Experts of the UN reported in December 2015 that «the cross-border traffic with Cameroon still represents one of the main sources of supply for hunting ammunition in the Central African Republic42.»

III. Central African Republic

The uncontrolled spread and illicit circulation of SALW and ammunition represent a major and a very old challenge for the Central African Republic (CAR). The perception of insecurity by civilians, fueled by a succession of a series of violence and the weakness of State responses, maintains the demand for illicit weapons at a high level.

In 2003, SAS estimated the number of illegal weapons in possession of civilians at 50,000 SALW43 and those of active and recent non-state armed groups at 8,872 arms44. As for government agencies, they had a stockpile of 11,381 SALW45. Most inventories of defense and security forces were lost when the former Seleka coalition seized power in 2013. The latest estimates point to about 3,000 weapons currently in the hands of the Armed Forces, of which only 300 are functional. The National Police stockpiles were estimated at some 1,895 SALW before the 2013 crisis46.

The origin of illicit arms and ammunition available in the Central African Republic is both internal and external. Analysis of the arms and ammunition seized during the past two years reveals that a significant proportion of these arms - presumably dominant - is derived from the stockpiles of security forces and the State Defence47. Most of these weapons and ammunition are from large scale looting by the former coalition Seleka during its advance on Bangui between 2012 and 2013 but also hijackings from elements of the armed forces and the Police48.

There is no industrial production of weapons or ammunition in CAR but craft production of weapons exists on the territory. These weapons contribute directly to the instability and armed violence because of their availability and their regular use by armed criminals or the militia49.

Although it is impossible to determine what proportion of weapons seized has come from neighbouring countries, several weapons previously belonging to the government forces of DRC / Zaire, Chad and, in all likelihood, Sudan, have been identified in these seized stockpiles. Furthermore, several batches of hunting ammunition manufactured in Cameroon and in the Democratic Republic of Congo, that were found in CAR in recent years, demonstrate the existence of cross-border trafficking of various magnitudes.

In recent years, some 3,000 weapons and nearly half a million number of ammunition were seized by international forces. According to agents of the police and the gendarmerie, the average daily seizures was twenty illicit weapons between March 2013 and late 2014, and then reduced to less than five per day in 2015. The information obtained on the evolution

44. For further details, see «Estimated Small Arms Stockpiles in CAR, State Agencies and Other (former) armed groups », by Eric Berman, published in ‘Small Arms Survey Yearbook 2005: Weapons at War’.
48. Ibid., p.23.
49. In this regard, see particularly S / 2014/452 and S / 2014/762 report of the United Nations Panel of Experts on CAR.
of the prices of weapons and ammunition on the black market also suggests that the availability of arms and ammunition on the market decreased significantly in 2015. If these figures likely provide an approximation of stocks in illicit circulation, they nevertheless make it possible to assess the extent of the problem and could represent an indication of the decrease in illicit circulation of arms.

The precise assessment of the number of arms and ammunition in illicit circulation remains today impossible, given the clandestine nature of these weapons. The Seleka attacks destroyed virtually all available data in the commands and the armourers’ concerning weapons and ammunition stored in arsenals. The locally craft-produced weapons remain outside any regulatory framework, making it difficult to determine the volume of traffic in such arms.

Finally, even now, some seizures made by government forces are immediately integrated into government stocks without being logged in official statistics.

**IV. Chad**

The study report on the proliferation of weapons in Chad could not establish a recent and coherent data on the volume on both legal and illegal weapons in circulation among the civilian population, nor those held by the military and the police. The estimates provided in the fact-finding mission by the Ministry of Security and several members of the civil society argue that a proportion of 5 to 6 of 10 households - both legally and illegally – possess a weapon.

If the succession of coups and armed conflicts since independence could increase the availability of weapons among the population, the 2010 normalization agreement with Sudan is the main source of supply of weapons to rebel groups. However, the unfulfilled series of plans of the DDR has facilitated in the coming together of disarmed rebels to operate as «Highway robbers», particularly at the eastern border beyond Abéché where armed robberies are frequent. Generally, the feeling of insecurity, self-defence and the symbolic character in arms possession among certain northern communities and central regions of the country constitute factors of the demand for weapons.

Despite the lack of industrial production on the territory and a few declining home-made arms, there is an illicit arms market where it is possible to acquire weapons such as handguns, Kalashnikovs and shotguns for sums between 228 and 760 euros. Without the origin of these illicit weapons being affirmed with precision, they could have been stolen, collected during disarmament operations or simply picked up after rebels flee. However, it seems that Chad is more of a transit than a final destination for illegal weapons, including AK-47s, rocket launchers and automatic machine guns - from Libyan stockpiles plundered and destined to certain terrorist groups active in the Sahel-Sahara region Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Islamic State (IS) and Boko Haram. Arms trafficking are frequent between elements of the Chadian army and the Nigerian sect, via the Cameroonian town of Kousseri and in the northern part of the country.

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50. GRIP, Chad: a hegemon with clay feet, prospective and strategic study, May 18, 2015, p.7.
Generally, understanding the phenomenon on the concept of proliferation has come to a standstill in the absence of statistics and estimated figures of weapons held by civilians and armed forces and the security, similarly to the monopoly by the Presidency on issues related to the control of arms, which does not communicate for instance on the seizures of weapons carried out by the armed forces. Registers of arms held by civilians, unlike those of the military and the police would also be poorly maintained and poorly managed.

V. Mali

As of early 2016, Mali is facing a very complex security situation. Not only does the country continue to deal with the secessionist insurgency in its northern regions, but it is also increasingly becoming the target of violence by regional and international extremist networks, as evidenced by regular attacks against the Malian armed forces and international peacekeeping forces, and more recently the attack against the Radisson Hotel in Bamako in November 2015\(^5\). Although the Algerian Agreements have been signed with the secessionist groups in the north, political tensions still remain and cease-fire violations are regularly reported\(^6\).

At the same time, competition between the different armed groups for the control of territory and smuggling routes continues, demonstrating clear links between armed insurgency and transnational crime in northern Mali\(^7\).

The field work done for this study did not succeed to obtain quantitative data on the flow of illicit SALW in Mali. However, a review of existing data offers some estimates that could partly constitute a database on the prevalence of SALW in the country. For instance, in 2007, the Small Arms Survey estimated that approximately 143,000 firearms (authorized or not) were in civilian possession, that is 1.1 firearms per 100 inhabitants\(^8\).

Data from the Small Arms Survey in 2006 estimated that stockpiles of the Malian defense forces contained about 13,000 arms, whilst police stockpiles were estimated at 17,800\(^9\). These holdings have certainly changed significantly because of the profound change of the security situation in Mali, even though, according to recent research, the majority of illicit weapons seized in Mali was found to have originated from national government stockpiles (Anders, 2015)\(^10\).

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51. Many radical Islamic groups claimed responsibility for the attack. See: http://www.jeuneafrique.com/292722/politique/attaque-radisson-blu-de-bamako-piste-dal-mourabitoune/

52. Operation Serval led by the French was deployed in January 2013, followed by Operation Barkhane, counter-terrorist, in 2015. An AFISMA mission led by ECOWAS was deployed in 2012, followed by Peacekeeping mission of the UN, the MINUSMA currently present.

53. According to Anders (2015, p. 165), «traffickers and the networks they operate in northern Mali are key players locally, as they forge alliances temporarily with armed groups to protect and promote their economic interests. Furthermore, trafficking networks apparently enjoy close links with political circles both in northern Mali and Bamako, where money can be laundered in construction projects.»


55. Karp Aaron, «Le ruisseau et le torrent: les stocks statiques,» in Small Arms Survey 2006: Des comptes à régler, Brussels, GRIP, for translation, July 1, 2006, Chapter 2 (Annex I), p. 61. It should be noted that the Government stockpiles marking campaign launched in 2014 has so far resulted in marking only 450 weapons held by the state. This is extremely worrying since the majority of illegal weapons found in Mali were taken into government stockpiles (Anders, 2015). Strengthening Physical security and the management of national stockpiles is an urgent priority in Mali.

There is information on factory production and export of cartridges of light weapons. The manufacture of craft produced weapons and ammunition is widespread. According to a 2008 study by the CNLPAL in collaboration with ECOSAP, more than 4,827 small arms were produced annually by 343 artisan producers, of which only five were legally registered (four being located in Bamako). The Mopti region, considered by some researchers as the cradle for the manufacture of craft-produced weapons accounted for about a one-third of the production, followed by the Bamako District (20%).

According to a 2011 estimate by the CNLPAL, the number of locally manufactured weapons reached about 7,000 per year (of which only about 1,000 were registered with the authorities).

Although more recent figures are not available, this production without any reasonable doubt continued and probably even intensified since 2008, given the recent crises in the North and the high demand for weapons.

The UNREC field research provided no other data did not bring in data on armed violence and illicit flows. All the same, the «Global Burden of Armed Violence» in 2015 cites estimates from an average of 238 homicides by firearms each year in Mali, that is a rate of 2.1 per 100,000 inhabitants, which is a relatively a low figure as compared to the global average.

**VI. Mauritania**

The study report on the proliferation of arms in Mauritania could not collect information or recent data on the volume of both legal and illegal weapons in circulation amongst civilians and weapons held by the military and the police. Indeed, despite several solicitations, the consultant could not make contact with the armed forces, who are the only authorities holding such information in the country.

The most recent study by the SAS on behalf of the UNDP, in 2010, estimated the number of weapons legally and illegally held by civilians at 70,000 in 2008. The consultant submitted this figure to the Director of the Judicial Police and National Security, who could neither deny nor confirm. However, the UNDP Office in Nouakchott, which conducted another study on the situation of SALW in Mauritania in July 2014, believes that the figure of 70,000 weapons «even appears to be below reality, at for least now.” In 2006, SAS also estimated the number of firearms available to the Mauritanian armed forces at 16,093 and that of firearms available to the police at 4,127 in 2004.
There is no industrial production of SALW in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. Arms belonging to the armed forces are imported. Despite the existence of an inventory, a control device considered as effective by international partners, theft or looting occasionally occur in Mauritanian warehouses. For instance, elements of the AQIM (then known as the GSPC) in 2005 stole some 58 Kalashnikovs and 50,000 cartridges in the attack of the Lemgheity military barracks, near the Algerian border 65.

In 2013, four Kalashnikovs were stolen in a warehouse of the 5th military region then recovered by the Gendarmerie 66.

Finally, the study confirmed sales and donations of down-graded arms and ammunition by the Army Staff to civilians and shooting clubs.

For not having had the opportunity to talk with military authorities nor those of the customs services, the consultant was unable to obtain precise information on cross-border flow of weapons to and from Mauritania. The main entry points of weapons to Mauritania are through the Malian border in the South and the East, and the border with Algeria and Western Sahara in the north and the northeast.

Moreover, it seems that there is an illegal arms market in the country (particularly Kalashnikovs, Simonovs and G3). According to the Mauritanian authorities, weapons produced by Malian blacksmiths are in circulation on the national territory.

There are no organized and structured criminal networks in Mauritania, but there are episodes of internal crime, raids, livestock theft, and land disputes where firearms are used from time to time. If there is the manufacture of home-made weapons, in small quantities, then they are for ritual ceremonies and are not used for criminal purposes, unlike other countries in the study.

Generally, Mauritania is known for a relatively low homicide rates as compared to other countries in West Africa, and nothing suggests that SALW is playing a leading role 67.

The SAS study reported that in 2010 in the Kiffa hospital situated in southern part of the country, medical staff were treating 4 to 5 people for injuries by firearms as against 5 to 6 each month for injuries by knives 68. The study found out overall, the problem of the proliferation of SALW arose in Mauritania, as compared to other countries in the region.

Generally, the root cause of arming civilians constitute a tradition and a necessity, namely the need for self-defense, the fight against livestock theft, the practice of national sport which is target shooting, and prestige-related reasons 69. Externally, due to the porosity of land borders, Mauritania suffers security fallouts of armed conflict and instability in several neighboring countries, which fuel illicit arms flows such as in Mali.

65. S. Pézard and GLATZ AK, op. cit., p. 17.
68. Ibid., P. 23.
VII. Niger

The Republic of Niger is facing significant security challenges, both within and outside its borders. While the peaceful conduct of the presidential election has augured a new era of stability and development in a country known to be affected by secessionist violence and military coups repeatedly\textsuperscript{70}, Security in Niger has suffered from the deteriorating security situation in the Sahel and North African regions in recent years\textsuperscript{71}.

Niger is struggling with both the impact of the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 and the presence of Boko Haram, while remaining a hub of trafficking and smuggling at the regional level\textsuperscript{72}.

As with the other countries covered by this study, field research of the UNREC provided little information on the illicit SALW flows.

However, in order to contribute to the establishment of an essential reference database, the information published by other sources provide a starting point for refinement as well as the exchange of information. For instance, the Global Burden of Armed Violence in 2015 cites estimates from an average of 199 homicides by firearms each year in Niger that is a rate of 1.6 per 100,000 people, which is little as compared to global standards\textsuperscript{73}. According to estimates by the Small Arms Survey published in 2007, national defence forces hold 6,270 arms in their stockpiles, whilst we believe that the police holds 18,035 arms\textsuperscript{74}.

The rate of civilian possession - authorized or unauthorized - has also been estimated at 93,791 arms\textsuperscript{75}. Although it is currently impossible to quantify, it is likely that the actual number of weapons in circulation in Niger has increased considerably over recent years due to the proliferation of SALW looted from army stockpiles and from the Libyan security forces, as well as – as it may seem—that of Malian forces.

According to available data on seizures of illicit weapons in Niger in 2011, the Nigerien authorities seized SALW and ammunition aboard several armed convoys. Also seized were rocket launchers, machine guns, heavy machine guns, type AK assault rifles, FN FAL automatic weapons, grenade launchers and pistols. The same year, 640 kg of Semtex explosives and 335 detonators were seized on board a vehicle from Libya probably to Mali\textsuperscript{76}.


\textsuperscript{71} In response to these multiple threats to security, in May 2015, Niger’s parliament approved a 1.5% increase in the 2015 budget of the mission of Defence (USD 2.9 billion) to cover expenses related to the fight against Boko Haram. (GRIP, 2015).


\textsuperscript{73} See Global Burden of Armed Violence 2015: Every Body Counts.


Over the first nine months of 2012, the Nigerien authorities reported to having seized more than 180 weapons and an indefinite number of ammunition, mainly in the northern part of the country and from Libya. According to authorities, this is a drop in the number of seizures as in 2011. In 2014, military equipment was seized several times in Niger by French troops of the operation Barkhane, including 1.5 tonnes of drugs and weapons of war (type PKM machine guns and Kalashnikov) during the operation bipartite Kounama III in May. In October, several tons of material was seized, including missiles belonging to MANPADS, anti-aircraft guns of 23mm, machine guns, anti-tank rockets and ammunition of small and large caliber. In 2015, seizures of SALW and ammunition continued.

Based on several small seizures in 2013 and on weapons collection organized by the National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (CNCCAI), officials of the Nigerien security agencies claim that many weapons belonging to civilians come from Libya. Some of these weapons could have been supplied by Gaddafi several years ago in support of groups based in Niger, whereas some

VIII. Nigeria

The Federal Republic of Nigeria faces a major security threat related to the circulation of Illicit SALW. Extremist violence perpetrated by Boko Haram in the northern regions, community fighting in the Plateau State and separatist claims in the Niger Delta, are all distinct but powerful threats to the stability of Nigeria and for peace in the region. Inadequate border control capacity also helps in the proliferation of SALW, whereas the growing problem of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and the activities of criminal networks are aggravating an already precarious security situation.

Although small arms are widely available in Nigeria, there are few documents stating the actual number of weapons in government stocks. In interviews with key informants, government security agencies confirmed keeping records of their own stocks of SALW, although none use a centralized data collection system. Though requested, official figures on government stockpiles of SALW could not be consulted during the study visit.

Therefore, this overview is based on information collected in the framework of the literature.

search. The most recent available information to the public found on the quantities of SALW held by the Nigerian armed forces dates from 2006, a year in which, according to reports, government stockpiles contained 179,550 firearms. Data from SIPRI show that between 2006 and 2010, Nigeria bought 72,000 assault rifles from China and 30,000 from South Korea, and between 2008 and 2009, another 1,200 assault rifles, 192 machine guns, and 75 grenade launchers were imported from Bulgaria. The only data available to the public on police stockpiles states that in 2012, the Nigerian Police Force had 360,000 firearms. Estimates of the illicit circulation of firearms in the country vary considerably, from one million in 2006 to seven million in 2013. A police report on arms and ammunition seized indicates 2,703 arms recovered from the state command, the majority of weapons seized were of «local production» (1,791), whilst the others were «guns» (475), «pump-action shotgun» (241) and pistol (196). Official data on seizures of the Nigeria Customs service (NCS) reported a total of 22 seizures of arms and ammunition between 2009 and 2014 (NCS, 2014, p. 46), but a detailed breakdown of this information was not available.

The national capacity of manufacturing SALW is awarded to the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON, the company belonging to the defence industries). Established in 1964, the objective of DICON is to produce SALW and ammunition for the armed forces. DICON is supposed to produce a type an assault rifle of type kalachnikov, OBJ-006, and ammunition of 7.62mm (SIPRI, 2011). In August 2015, President Buhari announced that DICON would increase arms production, but during the field research, it was not possible to get an accurate assessment of current manufacturing capabilities of DICON.

Beyond industrial weapons, this study confirmed that illegal craft-produced weapons are a big problem in Nigeria, the production of local weapons being considered as a source of relatively sophisticated weapons at affordable prices. However, domestic production remains outside the scope of the legislation and state control. Awka, in the Ananbra State, is considered a center for craft-producing of weapons. The manufacture of these weapons is done in the producers’ homes or backyards. Generally, home-made weapons are used for hunting, community policing and self-defence.

89. SIPRI, 2011. «Appendix A. Transfers of small arms and light weapons to sub-Saharan Africa.» The reactions to the growing number of attacks of Boko Haram have resulted to military operations, reactivation of a multinational joint working group (Joint Task Force), the adoption of an anti-terrorism bill in 2011 and the declaration of a state of emergency in the states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. Despite these measures, the violence continues. Some argue that the military response from the authorities has aggravated the security situation and has only strengthened complaints from civilians.
91. It is estimated that over 70% of the eight to ten million illegal weapons in West Africa are in Nigeria. In “The dangers of Illegal Weapons” eThis Day, October 29, 2013. http://allAfrica.com/stories/201310290646.html
92. Based on data gathered by a researcher of the Small Arms Survey in October 2015.
93. According to the official website of DICON: http://dicon.gov.ng/
95. Reuters, August 7, 2015, «Nigeria’s President Buhari announces weapons Production plan»; see : http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/07/us-nigeria-military-idUSKCN0QC1Q20150807 # jEbpBB5rCpV3gG.97
96. In November 2010, for instance, the police discovered equipment for the manufacture of arms in Barkin Ladi and Kuru in the local government area of South Jos in the Plateau State. In the southeastern part of Nigeria, a locally – manufactured arm known as the «Awka-made» is very popular amongst hunters, armed robbers, cult memebers and kidnappers, (Freedom, 2012).
Currently, the main priority of Nigeria in terms of security is to fight against the radical Islamist group Boko Haram. Since 2009, it is estimated that between 5,000 and 10,000 elements of Boko Haram perpetrated a long series of major attacks in northeastern part of Nigeria\textsuperscript{97}.

The increasing number of attacks by Boko Haram triggered several reactions, including military operations, the reactivation of a joint multi-national working group (Joint Task Force), the adoption of a draft anti-terrorism act in 2011 and the declaration of the state of emergency in the Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states. Despite these measures, violence has persisted. Some observers consider that the essentially military response of the authorities has worsened the situation and contributed to strengthening the grievances of the civilian populations\textsuperscript{98}.

Since 2009, it is estimated that 13,000 people have been killed as a result of the conflict with Boko Haram\textsuperscript{99}, while about 1.5 million civilians have fled to other parts of Nigeria and neighbouring countries\textsuperscript{100}.

Elsewhere in Nigeria, armed violence remains endemic. After the insurgency between 2006-2009 in the Niger delta, a presidential amnesty was accepted by rebel groups in 2009 and a DDR program was launched. Despite these efforts, kidnapping, oil theft, violence by security forces and politically-motivated violence persist, and there is concern that tensions are resuming in the Niger Delta\textsuperscript{101}.

In terms of armed violence and illicit flows, the UNREC field research was also able to obtain additional data. However, the Global Burden of Armed Violence 2015 cites estimates from an average of 4,659 homicides by firearms each year in Nigeria, that is, a rate of 3.4 per 100,000 people\textsuperscript{102}.

### IX. Senegal

The mission to Senegal could not gather data on the volume of civilian possession of firearms, nor of military and police stockpiles, more recent than the extrapolation made by the Small Arms Survey in 2007, when some 230,000 legal and illegal firearms were believed to be in civilian possession (that is, a relatively low rate of firearm possession of 2 per 100 inhabitants)\textsuperscript{103}. Still according to the SAS, the Senegalese army had 18 430 firearms (before or until 2006), while the police would have had 15 284\textsuperscript{104}. During the fact-finding mission, interlocutors belonging to Government institutions neither confirmed nor denied the estimates of weapons owned by civilians, the armed forces and the security forces.

Senegal does not have an industrial production infrastructure for arms. Firearms held by the Senegalese Defence and Security Forces (FDS) are imported. None of the sources consulted suggested that weapons belonging to the State circulate outside state control,


\textsuperscript{98} Asuelime, LE, and David, O., 2015, Boko Haram: The Socio-Economic Drivers, p. 104.


\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
nor that they are used by others than the armed forces - at least not in Senegal. However, there is some evidence of illicit SALW trafficking from Senegal to Mali, which included material from the stockpiles of the armed and security forces that would seem to have been diverted to Malian armed groups.

The study mission revealed that the weapons considered as illegal are not necessarily because of their use in criminal circles. These are mainly arms held by ordinary citizens who are not aware of current regulations on carrying weapons and / or have not bothered to comply with that regulation, such as by getting their permit renewed in a timely way. Broadly, the interlocutors believe that firearms do not play a central role in the so-called armed violence in Senegal. The country currently has a homicide rate far lower than other countries in the region. The use of knives for ill is reportedly at the least equally common.

Senegalese civilians seek firearms when they perceive to have a need for self-defense, some others do so for cultural motifs.

On the local black market for arms, an automatic handgun reportedly sells for a price ranging between 50,000 and 100,000 CFA francs (75-150 euros), that is considerably less than the price paid by civilians in the legal circuit, where such arms costs at the least 500,000 CFA.

The sources of arms in the illegal circuit appear varied. Some of the arms would appear to have been initially lawfully imported by civilians, and later fell in the hands of others that may use them for ill. Most of the firearms used in Senegalese crime scenes however appear sourced by cross-border traffic – not necessarily by large-scale organized operation, but rather by the trading of small number of weapons, often «recycled» after conflicts and rebellions in the subregion.

The source countries for illicit weapons in Senegal include Guinea-Bissau and Gambia. After the conflict in that first country, at the end of last century, a left-over stockpile found its way to Senegal, and more precisely to the separatist rebels of the Movement of Forces of Democratic Casamance (MFDC). This movement is also said to have received weapons from Gambia, the country which some interlocutors openly accused of supporting the Casamance rebellion. After signing the peace agreement between the Senegalese Government and the MFDC in December 2004, some of these arms were found amongst the civilian population. A limited number of these arms have since been recovered through voluntary return programs. The circulation of firearms in the border area with Mauritania was also mentioned in 2009 in the national survey that preceded the drafting of the Action Plan.

Finally, there is an illicit craft-production of firearms, which is located mainly in the region of Casamance, as well as in the central part of the country (Touba, Fatick and Kaolack). Some Senegalese regions suffer cattle rustling by criminals using locally-produced hunting rifles.

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105. Ibid., P. 6.
109. Observation made during a visit of a consultant of GRIP in a gun shop in Dakar.
110. Circuits of proliferation from outside are detailed in Part II of the national report.
111. COMNAT, Report on the implementation of the Action Programme to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the illicit trade of small Arms and Light Weapons in all aspects, January, 2012, p. viii.
II. Initiatives and measures to control small arms and light weapons

This chapter details the progress of key initiatives and control measures against the proliferation of SALW adopted by governments of the nine countries studied in fourteen different areas of intervention based on research carried out in the context of document review as well as national investigation reports.

### Themes of intervention studied

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. National Institutions</th>
<th>2. Legal provisions</th>
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<td>5. Record keeping</td>
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<td>13. DDR and weapons collection program</td>
<td>14. Cooperation and assistance</td>
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</table>

For each theme, the study identifies the best practices, lessons learned as well as the ongoing challenges at the national and, regional levels.

### I. National institutions

In each of the countries surveyed, it appears that a more or less large number of Government agencies are involved in national efforts against the proliferation of weapons.

The institutions that are at the heart of the process are usually the Ministries in charge of Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Customs, Environmental issues as well as the Presidency and / or the Prime Minister’s office.

All the countries surveyed have established a National Focal Point responsible for the connection between national and international Organizations.

**National commission for the fight against the proliferation of SALW**

In four countries, there is a National Commission in charge of coordinating the activities of different institutions in this area (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Senegal). In Nigeria, this role is filled by a presidential committee. In all of these countries except for Niger, the civil society is represented in the coordinating body; in Burkina Faso, there is the Association of Manufacturers Sellers and Importers of ammunition and weapons (NAFRIMA), and in Senegal, a representative of Arms dealers is present. In CAR, the National Commission created in 2010 stopped working in 2013 and de facto no longer exists. Finally, there is currently no National commission or a similar body in Cameroon, Mauritania and Chad.

Generally, National Commissions have modest budgetary resources provided by the authorities to cover staff costs. It is almost always expected that costs related to the implementation of intervention policies are covered by the participation of external donors (states, regional and international organizations and or United Nations agencies).
It is important to note that Burkina Faso, is the only country created in addition to the National Commission on SALW the High Authority on the control of Imports of Arms and their Ammunition (HACIAU). This institution is specifically responsible for controlling conventional arms transfers (that is, SALW and their ammunition), but its mandate also covers the prevention of diversion of weapons into the country.

**National Survey and Action Plan**

The National Action Plans, which are essential to guide a coordinated approach and Multisectonal policies in the fight against the proliferation of weapons have been adopted in three of these countries (Mali, Niger and Senegal). These documents were prepared on the basis of a national survey to deepen the knowledge of the proliferation of arms in the country concerned as well as its challenges in order to check the phenomenon. In Nigeria, having failed to conduct a survey on the problem nationally and adopting a National Action Plan, the government decided in 2013 to identify a list of seven priority activities.

In Burkina Faso, the Action Plan covering the period 2011-2015 was never formally adopted following the events that hit the country during the first half of 2011; since then, the National Commission works on the basis of an annual program.

It is interesting to note that in the countries surveyed, efforts to establish a National Commission, conduct a national, survey and adopt an Action Plan all occurred in ECOWAS countries and they all took place at the time this regional organization and its Member States had the support of the ECOWAS Small Arms Control Program (its acronym in English ECOSAP).

**Inter-Agency Cooperation**

The fact-finding missions conducted in the framework of this study failed to prove that there is a correlation between the formal existence of a coordinating body of activities and the level of coordination and effectiveness of government policies on the fight against proliferation. In this regard, other factors, such as the national administrative culture and the level of centralization of decisions appear to be explanatory factors equally relevant.

The existence of a National Commission does not guarantee the prevention or the avoidance of an absence or lack of coordination in activities. Thus in Mali, the National Commission, created in 1996 (in fact one of the oldest in Africa) is not considered systematically by actors and foreign institutions as the gateway for cooperation and international assistance activities. Contrarily, certain countries where no National Commission is in place do not seem incapable to carry out effective policies and / or attract International assistance (eg, Cameroon and Mauritania).

**II. Legal provisions**

Legal and regulatory instruments currently in force in the nine countries surveyed established clearly State monopoly on the possession of arms. They contain provisions to ensure that the acquisition and carrying of arms and ammunition by civilians require the agreement of authorities. Permissions are equally necessary in importation. Generally, these texts summarily identify the type of arms of which the acquisition and the use is restricted only to the armed forces and security forces but prohibited by civilians.

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The majority of these laws and regulations were made before the country’s independence (Nigeria) or the decade that followed (Cameroon, Mauritania, Niger, Central African Republic, Senegal and Chad). They contain important limitations and are insufficient to pursue an effective national policy in the fight against the proliferation of SALW and to meet regional (including the ECOWAS Convention on SALW and the Central African Convention SALW) and international commitments taken by these States (including the action program of the United Nations on the illicit trade of SALW, the United Nations Protocol on firearms and the International Arms Trade Treaty).

Thus, in the majority of the countries surveyed, it appears that there is no specific law on weapons belonging to government forces (for instance their, manufacture or acquisition control). Moreover, the legal provisions regarding weapons belonging to civilians are often limited to certain types of activities (such as import, acquisition or resale) while others are not covered (like re-export, transit or brokerage).

In all the countries surveyed, government representatives accepted the weaknesses of the national legal framework and the need to conform to regional and international standards and commitments. In all the countries except with Mali (which voted a new law in 2004) and CAR, a legal review and implementation process is in progress. However these initiatives, are relatively moving slowly mainly because of the existing strong centralization in some countries and difficulties of cooperation between the institutions.

Moreover, the recent adoption of the International Arms Trade Treaty has forced some governments to review current initiatives in order for the provisions to be taken into account. In the majority of cases, it was not possible to obtain, within the framework of this study, a copy of the bill and study its content (notably, how the bill is in compliance or not with regional and international commitments of the Government).

The study suggests that, even in the absence of adequate legal provisions (and in line with international standards) and control measures, there is not an automatically uncontrolled circulation of SALW. Thus, the information collected on Mauritania seem to show that despite a deficient legal framework, the proliferation of arms remains relatively limited as compared to other countries in the region. In other countries, the inadequacies of laws on weapons are pragmatically addressed by the provisions of the Penal Code (Cameroon).

Finally, in several countries, it was clear that the lack or absence of knowledge on legal framework, both within governmental institutions and on the part of civilians, is a major obstacle to the successful implementation of laws on arms.

### III. Production of SALW

All the countries surveyed control the manufacture of arms and ammunition either as part of their National laws on guns, or through the provisions of the Penal Code. The scheme set in place is usually that of a ban on the manufacture with the possibility of an exemption subject to obtaining an authorization or a specific license.

In countries where arms and / or ammunition are manufactured industrially (see Chapter I), these activities are controlled in a relatively clear manner. Home-made production activities of which, the magnitude varies from one country to another and within the same country, from one region to another (see Chapter I), are held without any structured control from the authorities despite the existence of specific legal provisions. The only exception is Burkina Faso where significant part of the arms manufacturers operate legally on the basis of certification provided by the authorities. This was facilitated by the constitution in association with armourers, blacksmiths and importers belonging to AFRIMA as well as by holding a census in 2014.
Despite these efforts, the scale of illegal home-made manufacture of arms remains unknown and this sector remains a significant source of supply for crime. In Mali, a 2008 study revealed that only five of the 343 arms manufacturers were legally registered.

Generally, in all the countries involved in home-made production, such arms are mostly for illicit reasons and, more specifically, national criminal networks or in neighbouring countries. Generally, the people met often had two key reasons for Home-made production to take place secretly: on one hand, the lack of knowledge of the regulations by the manufacturers and the buyers of their products and on the other hand, the absence of specific initiatives by the authorities to educate and manage this profession.

IV. Marking Systems

All participants in this study have agreed to international and regional standards on Marking of state and seized weapons. For instance, the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December 2005, stipulates that all States must mark their arms at the time of manufacture, and possibly at the time of import. According to the ITI, all weapons held by the State must be marked in an “appropriate” manner, in order to be identified as arms belonging to the state. In addition, as shown in paragraph 9 of the ITI, all illicit small arms that are seized must be uniquely marked and so registered, or destroyed as soon as possible.

The States participating in this study have also taken regional commitments, such as the ECOWAS Convention and the Kinshasa Convention. Both conventions have precise requirements in terms of marking: particularly, affixing a unique serial number, the identity of the manufacturer, as well as identifying the country and year of manufacture. Information concerning the identity of the buyer and the country of destination must also be included. These inscriptions must be expressed alphanumerically. The two conventions also require that all ammunition are marked.

This study showed that, in practice, the commitment of States to implement their international and regional obligations is relatively limited. In some areas, standards are summarily applied (for instance for the import marking) whereas much remains to be done in other cases, such as the marking of arms seized.

All the countries studied are bound to the obligation of the ITI «that weapons are marked whenever possible, at the time of importation.” These import marks should include the country and year of import. The ECOWAS Convention that Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal ratified, also requires that information appear on the identity of the buyer on marking and requires that entries must be made alphanumerically. It also requires that the ECOWAS logo is added and that all ammunition are marked. The study revealed that the legal instruments currently in place in these countries do not explicitly provide for such requirements.

A form of import marking exist in some countries, as shown in Senegal, where the Directorate of Equipment of the Army mark imported weapons in the country on behalf of the State (although this is not done in accordance with the obligations of the ECOWAS

113. In Nigeria the weapons seized are not currently marked. In Senegal, preparations were being made to start the collection of obsolete weapons from government stockpiles, as well as a new initiative to promote «voluntary surrender» of SALW held by civilians. The infrastructure required to store securely weapons collected before marking was still in progress at the time of the study, and marking machines already in place despite the lack of certain components.
convention). Machinery and training for the operation of machines were made available to the National Commission of Senegal by UNODC; but at the time of the study, no government weapon had been marked in accordance with the provisions of ECOWAS “due to lack of appropriate accessories.” The National Commission of Niger also received machines and training, but the marking process has not started yet. In Mali marking, government stockpiles in accordance with the provisions of the ECOWAS began in 2014; and, at the end of 2015, this effort resulted in marking 450 weapons held by the State.

This being said, the vast majority of industrial manufacturing of arms in circulation in the countries studied have marks. This is usually the markings by the manufacturer at the time of assembling the weapon, in accordance with provision of the ITI. It is important to note that these requirements of marking apply to Nigeria, the only country in the study, which has a production capacity of producing industrial SALW. In this regard, the Nigerian bill on firearms actually states effectively that a «unique identification mark on each firearm is necessary.» The study, however, did not determine to what extent the markings applied in that country are in compliance with current international standards.

Home-made weapons are less likely to be marked as home-made production is largely done out of government control, with the exception of Burkina Faso where home-made weapons produced in the country are mostly marked.
### Table VI: National marking practices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Regional marking Commitment</th>
<th>Observations on marking</th>
<th>Number of applications on tracing via IARMS</th>
<th>Observations on tracing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>ECOWAS Convention</td>
<td>No national legal requirements to mark arms (GRIP interviews, September 2015)</td>
<td>Information not available</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Arms manufactured locally are marked and folders must be kept for 10 years (GRIP interviews September, 2015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Kinshasa Convention</td>
<td>Seized arms are not marked (GRIP interviews, October 2015)</td>
<td>Information not available</td>
<td>Cameroon participates in the iARMS system which is managed by INTERPOL, through its National Central Bureau(^\text{114})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The home-made arms are not marked (GRIP interviews, October 2015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>Kinshasa Convention</td>
<td>There is no law governing any legal provision on marking</td>
<td>Information not available</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The marking machinery given by RECSA was stolen during the 2012-2013 crisis. Five marking machines were to be received from RECSA.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A marking training was given to the army and police officers in 2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Kinshasa Convention</td>
<td>There is no current ability to mark weapons held by the State (interviews, October 2015)</td>
<td>Information not available</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>ECOWAS Convention</td>
<td>The marking of stocks started in 2014 and up till now it has resulted in marking 450 arms held by the State [National Directorate of Water and Forest: 250; Police: 100; Customs: 100]. (Interviews, November 2015)</td>
<td>Information not available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The CNLPAL received computers to keep records on markings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Information not available</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Regional marking Commitment</th>
<th>Observations on marking</th>
<th>Number of applications on tracing via IARMS</th>
<th>Observations on tracing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>ECOWAS Convention</td>
<td>In 2014, the UNODC and the UNREC provided two marking machines to the National Commission. A training was equally given to 21 members of the commission. At the time of research, marking machines had not yet been used.</td>
<td>Information not available</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>ECOWAS Convention</td>
<td>Nigeria uses a different strategy to distinguish weapons belonging to the State (for instance, military weapons have markings painted green with NA identification, weapons belonging to the Police are painted in blue, yellow and black and are identified as P.F, etc.). The arms currently seized are not marked (Small Arms Survey, interview October 2015)</td>
<td>Information not available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>ECOWAS Convention</td>
<td>There is a law of marking at the time of manufacture (No. 73-1128 of 13 December 1973) with a number and serial letters. Imported weapons are marked and records are kept by the Directorate General of the Army (File analysis and GRIP interviews, October 2015) In 2014, the UNODC and the UNREC presented three marking machines to the National Commission. A training was equally given to members of the commission. At the time of research, the marking machines had not yet been used.</td>
<td>Information not available</td>
<td>The Creation of National Commission on tracing of SALW was announced in 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
V. Record keeping

According to international and regional commitments, the states in the region pledged to “preserve unique information (specific to each weapon or) relating to the manufacture, sale, transfer, possession and the destruction of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition.” The basic commitments for the conservation of data on SALW are clearly stated in the PoA which states that States must ensure that “complete and accurate records are kept for as long as possible on the manufacture, possession and transfer of small arms.” In order to facilitate the tracing of illicit weapons, the ITI requests that arms manufacturing records are kept for at least 30 years, and that all other records, including records related to transfers, are kept for a minimum of 20 years. In addition, the TCA requires each State keeps a record of export licenses or the number of arms exported and be kept for at least 10 years. Furthermore, the States that ratified the ECOWAS Convention must comply with more stringent requirements on data conservation on weapons since a national record and a computerized and centralized data bank must be stored permanently. Difficulties of government officials to provide or confirm estimates of the number of weapons in State stockpiles or number of weapons (legal) in the hands of civilians.

VI. Tracing

The International Tracing Instrument adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005 defines arms tracing as «the systematic tracking of illicit small arms and light weapons found or seized on the territory of a State, from the point of manufacture or import, throughout the supply chain to the point where they became illegal». This activity helps in collecting important quantitative and qualitative information on the trends of illicit arms markets: for instance, it can help determine whether the types of arms whether new or unusual entering the illicit market, identify trends as to the source of arms or reveal new and smuggling routes.

None of the countries surveyed currently has regulations that explicitly and adequately mention and tracing. Moreover, in none of the countries, was it found that the authorities had initiated or responded to arms tracing requests. Often, the partners met there, including government institutions, have limited or truncated knowledge on tracing. The failures in terms of marking and data keeping in most countries surveyed undoubtedly have a negative impact on governmental capacities to trace.

However, in some countries (notably, Cameroon), it was reported that when arms were found in criminal circles, the information provided by the criminals on the origin of the weapon (provided that it comes from within the country) were cross-checked in the Civil or government forces registers.
VII. International transfers

The control of international transfers of small arms and light weapons covers activities ranging from export and import of weapons in transit. Internationally, several instruments seek to regulate transfers and the fight against illicit trafficking of small arms, such as TCA, the United Nations Protocol on Firearms and the PoA. Similarly, at the regional level, the Central African Convention (ratified by Cameroon, Central African Republic and Chad) or the ECOWAS Convention (ratified by Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal) include relevant provisions on the subject.

In most of the countries surveyed, the laws on international transfers appear obsolete and do not cover all the actors concerned by the Small Arms Transfers (focusing only on civil activities, for instance, and not state transfer activities). The same applies to the covered activities (it is often only the import and transit of equipment).

The ECOWAS Convention prohibits all transfers of SALW and ammunition, and requires all requests for exemption are subject to a request to the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS. This document must contain information on the quantity and type of arms, the supplier, the final user and the supply process. The Executive Secretary of ECOWAS shall deliver, if approved by all Member States, a certificate of authorization120.

Burkina Faso is the only country surveyed which has a specifically dedicated body to control arms transfers, namely HACIAU. Despite a unique transfer control system of arms in the region, examples of diversions from Burkina Faso show the limits of the system as it currently operates.

Import

Except for Burkina Faso, none of the countries surveyed have a known legal framework that regulates activities on arms transfers to government forces. Despite the absence of specific regulations, however, the countries surveyed have a control system of imports based on established practices. These practices often suffer from a lack of transparency.

Generally, the armed forces management of military material and equipment orders is centralized in a structure within the Ministry of Defence (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mauritania, Chad, Senegal). Some countries (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Nigeria, Central African Republic and Senegal) claim to have implemented a final licensing system (CUF), generally produced by the Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces, or Interior. In the case of Senegal, it is sent to the supplier along with the authorization of arms transfer produced by the Secretary of ECOWAS.

In several countries surveyed (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mauritania, Senegal and Chad), import of firearms by civilians or traders requires an individual authorization, with a recognition of being “honourable” or of a «good moral character» and the respect of certain criteria. Depending on the country, the import license is issued either by the Ministry of Interior (Mauritania, Senegal), the Ministry of Security (Burkina Faso, Chad) or the Ministry of defence (Cameroon).

With this are added customs formalities, including the authorization control of import for customs clearance. In several countries, this license is limited (this is the case of Cameroon and Senegal).

120. Economic Community of West African States, Convention de la CEDEAO sur les ALPC, leurs munitions et autres matériels connexes entered into force on November 20, 2009, Art. 5.
Export

Most of the countries surveyed do not have a procedure or regulation in export control. The absence of the arms industry in their territory, and therefore exports of weapons, is usually put forward as justification for the lack of regulatory framework (Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad). Yet, some countries (Mauritania, Chad) have still recorded cases of exports or re-exports in recent years, including to countries under United Nations embargo. Burkina Faso has a structure (HACIAU) which is in charge of export control.

Transit and transshipment

The control of transit and transshipment is rarely a subject to specific measures (Mauritania, Nigeria and Chad). Only Senegal has a regulatory framework and established practices, particularly in the context of cooperation agreements on arms transit to Mali.

As for Cameroon, its transit control system relies more on established practices than on a legal framework.

VIII. Brokering

On the basis of information obtained during the fact-finding missions it can be concluded that none of the nine countries surveyed possesses legal provisions governing brokerage and intermediation of transfers of weapons and ammunition. However, Cameroon could use the provision of the penal code on the import and export of weapons without authorization to eventually monitor such activities.

Three countries (Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Senegal) reported to wanting to integrate brokering activities in the ongoing modernization projects of their respective laws on gun control.

Several open sources establish the presence of brokerage firms or brokers having operated in the past in at least four countries (Cameroon, Mauritania, Senegal and Chad), without this being confirmed by the interviewed stakeholders. In Senegal, a company was rumored to have been involved in the purchase of SALW and ammunition in 2009, re-exported to Côte d’Ivoire then under United Nations embargo. In Cameroon, some interlocutors said they had knowledge of Cameroonian nationals or foreigners acting as intermediaries in arms transactions.

IX. Stockpile management

Insufficient security measures on stocks are a major determinant of diversion to the illicit market. The secured management of government stockpiles of SALW and ammunition is a fundamental step towards a reduction of illicit flows of small arms. Importantly, it includes putting in place of measures for reducing the risk of diversion - which, in this case, is defined as the « ‘unauthorized change in possession or use of military materiel (arms, ammunition, parts, and explosives), from holdings or transfers, occurring domestically and internationally’"121. Maintaining the safety and security of state stockpiles is essential, given that poor management of these may have serious impact on crime, violence, political instability and physical damage122.

The definitions of stockpile management vary from one instrument to another. The Central African Republic Convention defines for instance Stockpile Management as «the procedures and activities related to the safety and security of the storage, transport, handling, accounting and the registration of small arms and light weapons, of all parts and components that can be used for their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly.»

National policies and procedures can guide initiatives to manage stockpiles in the possession of the armed forces, police and other security forces and increase safety in communities and to civilians. A number of areas must be taken into consideration when developing strategic plans for stockpile management.

Inventory management, registration, staff training, supervision, construction of storage facilities are just some of the areas that must be well designed for efficient implementation of stockpile management initiatives.

From this study, it appears that stockpile management remains an area for which little information are available. This situation is mainly explained by the extreme sensitivity of the topic for all the governments of the nine countries surveyed and the fear that sharing information on the matter could have adverse consequences on the security of the country.

Surveys conducted by independent organizations were able to be consulted by the GRIP and the Small Arms Survey in four of the countries surveyed (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and CAR). In each case, the assessments concluded that there were serious shortcomings in the management of state stockpiles which could have significant consequences in terms of safety and security. For instance, in Burkina Faso, a study conducted by the Mine Advisory Group (MAG) in 2015 reported very poor physical security level at the visited storage locations. Among the main conclusions and recurring problems on the management of military arsenals in Burkina Faso: «a significant lack of technical training of staff in charge of armouries, [...] the lack of standard operating procedures for the management of arms and ammunition nationally [...]lack of material and equipment to ensure the integrity and security of stockpiles.» Similar considerations can be made for the other three countries studied. A similar study was conducted by the MAG in Chad but it was not possible for GRIP and the Small Arms Survey to access its findings.

In the absence of external surveys, the only information available for an overview of practices of stockpile management is based on government-based statements and reports, as well as the prevalence episodes of diversion from the stockpile or accidental explosions of arsenals. Yet, Cameroon and Senegal enjoy certain security stability. They have never known an episode where the government lost control of a significant part of its stocks and have not issued any request for assistance for strengthening their stockpile management capabilities. In these two countries (despite the apparent existence of small-scale diversion from government stockpile in Cameroon), the overall assessment of the situation, both on the part of government partners and external partners, is generally positive although probably not in line with international and regional standards in this area. Finally, according to the Small Arms Survey database listing accidental explosion on sites between 1979 and 2014, there was only one of such incidents in Cameroon, and none in Senegal.

123. Central African Republic Convention on the control of small arms and light weapons, their ammunition and all parts and components that can be used for their manufacture, repair and assembly, 2, v.
In Mauritania, all the Mauritanian government warehouse of arms benefited from the program of secured management of stockpiles from NATO through its forum on security cooperation on Mediterranean Dialogue.\textsuperscript{126}

In Nigeria, from the confession of government representatives, stockpile management practices are considered underdeveloped. Control mechanisms are weak and stockpile management practices could be improved although the situation varies from one agency to another. The arsenals are often subjected to looting and several of them were captured by Boko Haram. Another worrying factor is the safety of ammunition stored in warehouses. The Small Arms Survey database of accidental explosions ammunition on sites reported three accidental explosions in 2002, 2005 and 2009 of State arsenals which killed at least 1505 people and injured 5044 others\textsuperscript{127}.

X. Civilian firearms possession

All of the countries surveyed have laws on firearms possessed by civilians. However, this regulatory framework is generally outdated and incomplete. In addition, it is often ignored by authorities or less respected by the population. In many countries, a lack of knowledge of the legal provisions by part of the population explains that some arms are found illegally in the administration (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Senegal). In some countries, the much too complex or restrictions push civilians to buy from the illegal market (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Nigeria and Senegal).

Several countries surveyed only authorize the possession of firearms by civilians for specific activities, especially for hunting or for self-defence (Nigeria and Central African Republic). Often the law does not mention the legitimate reasons for a civilian to acquire a weapon (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mauritania, Niger and Chad) or it does not explicitly define them (Senegal), giving the authorities a discretion power. Some countries have chosen to prohibit the possession of firearms by civilians, with possible exceptions, and establish legal sanctions including imprisonment or going before the military court for violation (Cameroon, Mauritania, Senegal).

In several countries surveyed, the possession of arms by civilians is subject to a control mechanism by the authority in charge of granting possession permits: the Ministry of Territorial Administration (Cameroon, Central African Republic), the Ministry of Security (Chad) Ministry of Interior (Niger, Nigeria, Senegal). Permits are generally issued after filing a request and on the condition of the recognition of a «good character», the respect of certain criteria (age-related) and the payment of an administrative tax (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Niger, Central African Republic). Some countries limit in time the validity of holding authorizations which must be renewed each year (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Senegal). Chad has suspended indefinitely the process of granting authorization to purchase and carry firearms.

Several countries have a specific legal framework for the sale and transfer of firearms by trade and armourers (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mauritania and Senegal). The arrangements for the transfer of a weapon following the death, and the cessation or the sale of the weapon are all subject to laws in several countries surveyed (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Senegal).

\textsuperscript{127} SAS, «Unplanned Explosions at Ammunition Sites »Database updated on March 4, 2015.
The registration of arms possessed by civilians in a database and their control can have some limitations; especially due to lack of means of the administration (see above «Conservation of Data»).

XI. Border Controls

In most countries surveyed, the partners met recognized the problems of cross-border trafficking of SALW proliferation, which is taking more shape in small-scale trafficking (also called «ant trafficking»). They also highlight the lack of equipment by actors in charge of border control (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Niger, CAR and Chad). Corruption is also mentioned (particularly in, Mali, Nigeria and in Chad) as an aggravating factor to the proliferation of weapons across borders.

At the borders, it seems that the fight against trafficking of firearms is carried out more in the broader context of operations in the fight against terrorists and insurgent groups (Senegal, Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria, Niger).

Generally, the forces dedicated to border management are mixed (armed forces, Security forces, customs), and may include inter-agency operations (Cameroon, Niger and Chad). In Mauritania, 48 points of compulsory border crossings were established in 2010, including the Directorate of the territorial surveillance and the Gendarmerie, whereas Special Intervention Groups are responsible for anti-terrorist operations. In at least two countries the “natural”, character of some borders would pose a problem of the effectiveness of controls, especially when it is close to a country plagued by armed struggles (Burkina Faso forest where Ivorian rebels are believed to be hiding, an uninhabited mountainous area in northern Chad at the Libyan border).

In 2012 and in 2014 Chad decided to close its borders with Libya and the CAR. Finally, in Cameroon, the counter-offensive with Boko Haram in the Far North region resulted in closing its borders; this allowed the authorities to seize several arms and has probably brought arms trafficking networks to adapt their techniques notably by reducing the size of the cargo.

All the countries have bilateral cooperation agreements in the field of border management, from simple exchange of information (Burkina Faso) to joint patrol mechanisms. However, these joint patrols are not specifically mandated to fight against arms trafficking, but almost systematically to fight armed groups (Cameroon, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Chad) or looting and border theft (Mauritania, Mali and Senegal).

A trend towards multilateral cooperation within the framework of the regional fora, is also taking shape and have its objective for the fight against terrorist groups in the region: it is the case of the Commission of the Lake Chad Basin which announced the creation of a force up to 8,700 men in 2015 (Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Benin), and the Sahel G5 which announced Patrols of 1,000-1,500 men in December 2014 (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad).
XII. Awareness-raising campaigns

In most countries surveyed, the authorities launched, awareness activities on topics related to SALW, except for Cameroon and Mauritania where no national wide campaign has currently been organized by the authorities.

The authorities in charge of the design and implementation of public awareness programs are generally the National Commission where it exists (Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal) or the Government (Chad). In some cases, several authorities simultaneously conduct public awareness programs, as in Burkina Faso with the National Commission and the High Authority on control of imports of arms and their use (HACIAU), and Senegal with the National Commission and the Ministry of Education. In most countries, civil society organizations are also involved, to varying degrees, in carrying out these activities (Niger, Central African Republic, Senegal and Chad), as well as other local stakeholders such as traditional leaders, religious bodies (Niger) or professional groups (the federation of craftsmen in Mali). Finally, we note the regular support of International NGOs and financial partners in the public awareness programs.

These campaigns usually deal with hazards in the use of weapons, incitement to voluntary surrender arms and information to DDR plans, particularly in countries who experienced a state of war or are presently struggling with attacks by non-state armed groups (Niger, Central African Republic, Senegal and Chad). Sensitization on of the legal provisions and procedures governing the possession of arms as well as and the spread of key legislative text constitute the second theme for awareness campaigns. In Burkina Faso and in Senegal, the National Commissions for instance conducted such awareness campaigns on the principles of national legislation, the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and the TCA. In Nigeria, the national report stated just a sensitization by PRESCOM to inform the public on a household survey on firearms.

It is interesting to note that if the civilian population becomes the first to engage in awareness-raising campaigns, at least three countries (Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal) undertake such activities specifically targeting government officials (defence and security forces, mayors, parliamentarians, administrative authorities in charge of gun control) and non-government officials (armourers and weapons manufacturers). In Mali, traditional hunters are also a target for sensitization initiatives.

The means used to implement these campaigns are generally the modern media (radio, television spots and billboards posters), that broadcast in at least one country with messages in several languages (CAR). In Niger and in Senegal, more traditional media were also used, namely stories, tea ceremonies and religious sermons.

XIII. DDR and recovery of arms

Among the nine countries surveyed, six have completed or are currently engaged in DDR plans in wider peace agreements with rebel groups. Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Mauritania have not so far implemented such programs.

Generally, the fact-finding missions underscore the lack of information, sometimes from the authorities themselves, on the total number of weapons collected during the different phases of DDR, which therefore prevents the conclusion to the success or failure of disarmament (Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Chad).
The assessments from interviews generally report the failure of the DDR plans in terms of the reintegration of ex-combatants (Nigeria, CAR and Chad), the main causes being the lack of funds to implement the agreed activities, the lack of Confidence of targeted armed groups and the dysfunctions within the institutions in charge of planning which does not allow effective monitoring. In Chad, the authorities in charge of the National Program of demobilization and reintegration initiated in 2010, have reduced by more than four the allowance expected for each disarmed fighter to undertake an income-generating activity, having apparently not received sufficient funding. According to some observers, the 2013 crisis in CAR would have symbolized the failure of DDR plans previously unfinished.

Meanwhile, at least four countries have conducted or is presently conducting voluntary return programs of weapons (Mali, Nigeria, CAR and Senegal) in exchange of money or support for the creation of community projects. The CAR government has for instance created in March 2015 a committee of voluntary collection responsible for the recovering of weapons diverted from the state stockpiles, through three collection points in the capital and activities in other cities of the country. Besides the voluntary collection initiatives, the Chadian government also conducts forced disarmament operations through the command of the Joint mobile military force for disarmament, which can go up to surrounding an entire neighborhood to conduct search on civilians.

Although this is not a DDR plan strictly speaking, it is interesting to note that Chad led from 1991 to 1997 and then in 2011 a two-phase reduction of army personnel and consecutively undertaken disarmament programs on them.

### XIV. Cooperation and assistance

**Cooperation**

Although national reports (available in Annex I) recall the variety of dynamics to each country, we can establish that the preferred activities in terms of cooperation concern the strengthening of border control, through the establishment of joint patrols, exchange information or strengthening of human and material capacities of actors in charge of the control.

**Assistance**

The fact-finding missions have shown that almost all countries benefit or have benefited from assistance programs in the fight against the proliferation of SALW. Cameroon appears as an exception; because the country has so far been little involved in dynamics of cooperation and assistance, except by its membership ECCAS which is a beneficiary to the Support Program to ECCAS Actions for Peace and Security (PAPS). The fact-finding mission in Nigeria did not allow the collection of information about it.

Despite the conduct of assistance activities in the majority of the countries, only two of them

Formulated their needs through instruments put in place by the PoA since 2005 and have not obtained positive response (Burkina Faso and Niger).

The activities generally concern the following themes:

- Stockpile management (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, CAR and Chad);
- Marking (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Senegal); and
• Sensitization programs for voluntary returns of weapons and risks related to illicit SALW (Mali, Niger and Senegal).

Most often, the United Nations agencies are the implementing agencies on the assistance activities of some international NGOs such as MAG, while the European Union finances these activities in at least seven of the nine countries (lack of information on Nigeria and Mali). It is interesting to note that Mauritania equally benefited from the assistance of strengthening the stockpile management on the part of NATO, through its Mediterranean Dialogue. Some countries, such as Germany, the United States, France and Japan, are also active in the assistance programs in the region.
Conclusion

This interim report is part of the project «Assessment Survey on Small Arms in the Sahel region and neighbouring countries.” It examined the circulation of SALW in nine countries in the Sahel and its environs (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Senegal and Chad) as well as initiatives and control measures that they have initiated and implemented to prevent and fight against the proliferation of these arms and their ammunition. To do this, this report was based firstly, on the results of fact-finding missions that were conducted in the nine countries surveyed by the consultants and, on the literature review and additional research by the GRIP and the Small Arms Survey.

Despite the limitations inherent in this type of exercise and the lack of available figures, this report however allowed to highlight a number of common characteristics but also differences between the countries surveyed in regard to the following areas: armed violence, circulation of arms (including weapons possessed by governments and those possessed by civilians), the manufacture and circulation of home-made arms and ammunition; the industrial production of arms and ammunition, the recent routes and dynamics of trafficking as well as the link between arms and crime. At the same time, a lot of information was collected regarding control measures and initiatives taken in the nine countries surveyed in the fight against the illicit proliferation of SALW, particularly, the best practices, lessons learned as well as the ongoing challenges at the national and, in some ways, regional levels.

Given the magnitude of the work but also the specific context in each country surveyed, the final conclusions and recommendations of this report will greatly benefit from discussions and exchanges that will take place on the occasion of the regional validation workshop. On this basis, the final report will be amended and finalized. It will then present the main findings of the study and a series of recommendations based on the results of the fact-finding missions and interviews with partners in the countries visited and internationally. These final recommendations will help in guiding relevant programmatic initiatives to be taken by national authorities, regional and / or international Organizations.
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