Publications

Le Congo-Brazzaville et le Rwanda dans la nouvelle géopolitique angolaise : entre hégémonie coopérative et équilibre des puissances

La politique extérieure de l’Angola à l’égard du Congo-Brazzaville et du Rwanda est symptomatique des mutations et de la recomposition des dynamiques politiques en cours dans la sous-région de l’Afrique centrale.

La gestion par l’Angola de sa situation de guerre civile, puis des crises survenues dans la région au cours des dix dernières années, a donné à l'Angola sa propre approche de résolution des conflits et forgé une tendance à cibler des partenariats qui priorisent ses propres intérêts nationaux.

Toutefois, les évolutions politiques récentes dans la sous-région – notamment la montée d’autres puissances prétendantes –, ainsi que la prise en compte du coût des cycles de conflits en Afrique centrale au cours de cette dernière décennie, semblent en partie questionner la viabilité des logiques de projection militaire, au profit d’un retour à la logique diplomatique et au multilatéralisme comme mode de renforcement de l'environnement sécuritaire régional.

Le Tchad : un hégémon aux pieds d’argile

Déjà reconnu pour sa contribution déterminante dans la lutte contre les djihadistes et groupes armés au nord du Mali, le Tchad a confirmé ses aspirations au leadership dans l’espace sahélien en s’appropriant la direction de la lutte contre les islamistes nigérians de Boko Haram, et en reléguant au second plan les géants nigérians et camerounais, pourtant nantis d’économies plus puissantes et plus diversifiées.

À l’instar d’autres puissances montantes de la sous-région, comme l’Angola ou le Rwanda, le Tchad adosse sa politique d’influence naissante sur deux leviers, la capacité de projection de son armée et le déploiement d’une diplomatie volontariste pour se positionner comme interlocuteur incontournable dans l’espace sahélien et en Afrique centrale.

Sa position stratégique, à la charnière des espaces géopolitiques et des systèmes de conflits (de la zone sahélo-saharienne à l’espace nilo-soudanais), sa stabilité relative – en dépit du caractère autoritaire de son régime politique –, ainsi que la qualité de ses forces armées, ont contribué à faire du Tchad, le pivot franco-américain d’une stratégie du contre-terrorisme dans la sous-région.

Children victims of armed conflicts: practices and struggle in Africa

The issue of children victims of armed conflicts has been at the center of the international community concerns, for more than three decades. Yet, the report shows that despite the resources gathered, the problem remains alarming. In Africa especially, the rising power of terrorist armed groups creates an overall atmosphere of insecurity for children who are enrolled as soldiers or are victims of many other abuses. Considering that, the means for a struggle defined by the African Union and the sub-regional institutes of Central and Western Africa – the most vulnerable parts of the continent – arouses thoughts.

Crédit photo: centre de réhabilitation d’enfants soldats en Centrafrique (source: DG ECHO / Gregoire Pourtier)

Nuclear agreement with Iran, a geopolitical revolution for the Middle-East and for the world

Faced with the rise of the dangers in the Middle East, and with the nuclear risk in this region, the international community understood that it was better to turn Iran into an ally rather than an enemy. The traditional US allies – Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries in the first place – are worried to see their Persian enemy potentially come back into. The signature on July 14th 2015 of the agreement on Iranian nuclear power, turns over a painful page of History in the relations between the West and the Middle East. The new relations which could take place between Iran and the rest of the world could be as important as was the hand extended by President Nixon to China in 1972. And today we know where this led China.

Crédit photo: Nojan Mansoory / Licence creative commons (Téhéran)

Arusha’s achievements in Burundi: what will they become?

While the 2015 electoral process promised to be a test for the consolidation of democracy in Burundi, the current crisis raised fears of an abandonment of the principles from the Arusha agreement. The latter had laid the foundations for an end to the civil war, the setting up of a consociational model of power sharing. Supposed to guarantee peace by overcoming antagonisms, this model is now threatened by a deteriorating political situation in recent years and the current political dead-end prompted by the renewed candidacy of Pierre Nkurunziza.

Crédit photo: Mission d'observation électorale des Nations unies au Burundi 

Maritime security in the Indian Ocean: prospects for the European Union?

Since 2008, the European Union (EU) is at the forefront of the struggle against piracy in the Horn of Africa. Despite political constraints and operational challenges, the Union and its member States have taken stock of the current issues in the realm of maritime security and safety. The Indian Ocean is a new stage in the European maritime commitment, and an interesting field to demonstrate the EU's ability to be worthy of its status. Through the development of its "sea power", the whole Union is striving to maintain a long-term strategy instead of short-term decision-making.

 

Monitoring of regional Stability in the Sahel region and in West Africa – April to June 2015

This quarterly monitoring, published by GRIP since 2011 is part of a project named “Contributing to improve human security, conflict prevention and strengthening the rule of law in Sub-Saharan countries” funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

It aims to monitor the security situation in West Africa with a focus on Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Senegal. It examines in particular broad internal security issues, regional tensions, and cross-border crime and trafficking.

Crédit photo : Jacob Zocherman - CICR

Commission for Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation in Côte d'Ivoire : the reconciliation never happened

At the end of the crisis that followed the 2010 presidential elections, President Alassane Ouattara has set up a Commission for Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation in Côte d'Ivoire. After three years, this instrument of transitional justice concluded its work by submitting a report to the Ivorian authorities on 15 December 2014. With overly ambitious attributions, misundersood by the people, and an inability to translate into concrete policies the speeches about the need to unite, the institution seems to have failed to carry out its mission, namely to promote reconciliation and a stronger social cohesion.

(Crédit photo: Daniel Lopes - Côte d'Ivoire, septembre 2010)

La posture régionale de l’Angola : entre politique d’influence et affirmation de puissance

La recomposition des dynamiques régionales africaines, au tournant des années 90 et au cours des années 2000, a consacré l’émergence de nouveaux pôles de puissance, et relancé la course au leadership, pour laquelle l’Angola, par la diversification de ses partenariats et alliances, semble en mesure de confirmer un nouveau rôle sur la scène africaine et internationale. Longtemps forcé de se concentrer sur les questions internes, par la guerre contre l’UNITA, l’Angola est sorti de son isolationnisme à la faveur des crises dans les deux Congo, dont la gestion a propulsé l’Angola au rang de puissance régulatrice régionale.

S’appuyant sur son statut stratégique, lié notamment à ses abondantes ressources pétrolières, ainsi que sur une politique extérieure dynamique et innovante, l'Angola entend s’affirmer comme un partenaire économique privilégié pour les partenaires extérieurs – puissances traditionnelles et pays émergents – en vue de son intégration dans l'économie mondiale. Cette politique d’émergence s’appuie également sur l’exploitation des opportunités que peut procurer à l’Angola, sa triple appartenance à la SADC, la CEEAC et la CPLP, à travers une participation active à la gestion des questions touchant à l'intégration régionale et à la paix et la sécurité, tant en Afrique australe, en Afrique centrale, dans le golfe de Guinée et dans l’espace lusophone.

The Permanent Structured Cooperation: the Sleeping Beauty of the European Defence

Raising the subject of the “Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)” in the circles of power generally produces shrugs of distinterest or disillusion. However, the acronym is frequently heard in Brussels, recently. So, what is really PESCO? A major innovation of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, when it was rewritten in the Treaty of Lisbon, PESCO was distorted and became illegible. Therefore, in order to understand what it really is, one needs to rediscover the original spirit of the preparatory works which led to it writing.

PESCO is, with the European Defence Agency and the Collective Defence Clause, one of the three indivisible elements which were eventually to give birth to the “European Security and Defence Union”, the carbon copy of the Economic and Monetary Union. It was supposed to be created before the enlargement. But it was not. Nevertheless, the mechanism contained in it remains intact. It only needs one condition to be implemented: willingness.

(Photo credit : GRIP/Ludovic Sultor-Sorel)

EU, ECOWAS and electoral observation in West Africa

Something might change in West Africa during the next two years. On 28 March 2015, one of the most influential countries of this continent succeeded in its electoral gamble, projecting itself toward a pacific and ordered democratic alternation. This is a historical step for Nigeria, which is also the predominant ECOWAS Member State. The latter, by extension, could benefit from such a success. Very active in the area of electoral observation, ECOWAS missions could now enjoy a growing authority when they will deploy in other Member States. A new wind is blowing from Western Africa, at a time when this region is about to face eight other presidential consultations in the coming couple of years. The EU, a traditional partner of African democratic transitions, should take advantage of it.

(Photo crédit: EUEOM)

The end of the EUPOL RD Congo mission: what can be expected in the forthcoming of the Congolese elections?

The EUPOL RD Congo mission ended in December 2014. One month later, large protests sparked violence in Kinshasa. The police forces violently cracked down on this movement, a reaction that highlighted their persisting shortcomings. This paper has a double objective: assessing some of the lessons learned from the EUPOL mission, more specifically addressing its strategic aspects both for the EU and the DRC, and identifying security perspectives in a context of pre-electoral tensions. 

Crédit photo:  Jessica Hatcher/IRIN News

Replacing the F-16 fighter fleet: the construction of a need in matters of Belgian armament

This Analysis is again addressing the question of the appropriateness of the renewal of the Belgian Air Defence F-16 fighter fleet, which is framed as obvious in the coalition agreement of 2014. The note highlights how representations conveyed by certain industrial and military structures are rooted into the Belgian political landscape, and how strategic discourses, too, contribute to the construction of a perceived need in terms of armaments.

Photo : combat aircraft cemetery in US Air Force-base in Arizona (source: Davis-Monthan Air Force Base)

Monitoring of regional Stability in the Sahel region and in West Africa – January to March 2015

This quarterly monitoring, published by GRIP since 2011 is part of a project named “Contributing to improve human security, conflict prevention and strengthening the rule of law in Sub-Saharan countries” funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

It aims to monitor the security situation in West Africa with a focus on Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Senegal. It examines in particular broad internal security issues, regional tensions, and cross-border crime and trafficking.

Crédit photo: soldat nigérien de la MINUSMA en poste à Ménaka (source: MINUSMA/Marco Dormino)

Niger: Heading Toward 2016! Political and Security Situation on the Eve of the Elections

For Niger, 2016 will be an electoral year. The first democratic transition since the 18th February 2010 coup will be the occasion for president Issoufou to present its results. The results are mixed for this country which had to consent large defense investments in order to cope with the crises in Libya, Mali, and Nigeria. In addition to external threats which trigger internal insecurity, Niger faces the danger of a developing criminal economy, especially in the Sahara. Finally, the political opposition, weakened and fragmented, can undermine the elections in a context where the authorities have done more foreign policy than domestic politics. 

Crédit photo: le président Issoufou inspecte un Soukhoï SU-25 (source: site de la présidence du Niger)

Terrorisme et contre-terrorisme en Afrique centrale : quelle vision stratégique pour le Tchad et le Cameroun?

La poussée meurtrière de Boko Haram, dans les zones transfrontalières des pays riverains du Nigeria, s’inscrit dans des dynamiques antérieures de dégradation de la situation sécuritaire. Dans ces zones excentrées et en déshérence, la marginalisation économique et le désinvestissement des États, ont conduit progressivement à l’enracinement et au développement de certaines activités illicites,  ainsi qu’à des formes de violence dont le terrorisme n’est qu’une des variantes récentes. Aux effets du sous-développement et de la pauvreté, à l’insuffisance de l’analyse et aux contraintes politiques et économiques internes, ont succédé des réponses prioritairement sécuritaires, au Nigeria d’abord, et ensuite dans l’Extrême-Nord du Cameroun. L’impact de ces mesures reste aléatoire, sans que l’on observe pour autant, à court terme,un infléchissement des activités des groupes criminels dont la trajectoire transcende les limites frontalières des États. Les actions de Boko Haram bousculent les dispositifs de défense et de sécurité des pays de la région, et les appellent au renouvellement de leurs doctrines en matière de prévention, de gestion des risques et menaces, dont les menaces terroristes... 

3e conférence sur l’impact humanitaire des armes nucléaires, un nouveau cycle d’actions

Le processus des conférences sur l’impact humanitaire des armes nucléaires a connu une accélération entre mars 2013 (Oslo) et décembre 2014 (Vienne), ce qui marque une volonté des États non dotés d’armes nucléaires, appuyés par la société civile, de sortir de la léthargie qui régnait dans les forums onusiens du désarmement. La conférence de Vienne a consacré cet objectif : compléter le savoir déjà acquis dans les conférences précédentes et ouvrir de nouvelles perspectives pour combler le vide juridique existant.

Monitoring of Regional Stability in the Sahel region and in West Africa– October to December 2014

This quarterly monitoring, published by GRIP since 2011 is part of a project named “Contributing to improve human security, conflict prevention and strengthening the rule of law in Sub-Saharan countries” funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. 

It aims to monitor the security situation in West Africa with a focus on Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Senegal. It examines in particular broad internal security issues, regional tensions, and cross-border crime and trafficking.

Crédit photo : Centre de traitement du virus Ebola de Nzérékoré, en Guinée (source: UN Photo/Martine Perret - 9 janvier 2015)

Indonesia’s defense industry: the key to power?

Since 2010, the Indonesian government has embarked on an ambitious journey of « revitalizing » and developing its defence industry. Between economic optimism, political opportunities and constraints, strategic issues and operational challenges, the ascent of Indonesia’s defence industry raises many questions. Transpiring from this development are the sheer complexity of a country’s “emergence”, and the strategies of its leaders. This note offers an entry point to an issue that is necessarily multifaceted, but also critical for the future of Indonesia’s place and role in the global arms market, and equally key to a seemingly ever more fragile regional stability.   

Crédit photo : Blindé "Badak" (rhino), développé par l’entreprise indonésienne PT Pindad, en collaboration avec le fabricant belge CMI (tourelle). 

Electoral Challenge in Burkina Faso.The EU facing the enigmas of the transition

This article could be summarised by a question mark, which will only find an answer in November 2015, when the transition in Burkina Faso will lead to presidential, legislatives and local elections. A courageous but still enigmatic transition, which raises hope as much as concern. In such an uncertain environment, the European Union, traditional partner of African democratic processes, is called to proceed cautiously and prudently. It is like a bull in a china shop. 

Crédit photo: compte Facebook du mouvement d'opposition burkinabé "le balai citoyen"

The management of cross-border areas in the Sahara-Sahel: Between living spaces and "grey areas"

As the security situation deteriorates in the Sahara-Sahel area as a consequence of the Libyan crisis, the border areas have been the subject of different security approaches by regional and extra-regional actors. In the Sahara-Sahel, two visions are facing each other. One considers the border as a fixed line which is supposed to be strictly controlled: it is the vision conveyed by the Sahel region states and their extra-regional partners. The other vision considers the Sahara-Sahel areas, in particular the border areas, as open and dynamic spaces: this vision is shared by the local people, nomads, migrants, irregular armed groups and even some state actors.

Crédit photo : poste-frontière de Maghnia en Algérie (Magharebia / Licence creative commons)

La CBLT et les défis sécuritaires du bassin du lac Tchad

La CBLT constitue le principal cadre institutionnel pour une action concertée des pays riverains du lac Tchad, face à la montée de nouvelles menaces sécuritaires transfrontalières. L’activisme du groupe islamiste nigérian Boko Haram, dans l’État du Borno et dans les zones contiguës des États voisins du Nigeria, apparait comme l’une de ces menaces sécuritaires montantes, si elle venait à s’articuler aux autres formes d’insécurité déjà présentes dans la sous-région.  À savoir, les trafics d’armes, les vols à main armée, la contrebande de pétrole, le vol de bétail, etc. La situation qui prévaut dans l’État nigérian de Borno est en grande partie le fruit des inégalités sociales criantes, et la conséquence d’un désinvestissement de l’État, dans cette région excentrée du pays, pourvue pourtant d’importantes ressources arables et hydriques. Cette caractéristique structurelle, commune aux pays de la région et opposant un centre à une périphérie en déshérence, est facteur déterminant de vulnérabilité. 

Lebanese army and Hezbollah: Complementarity, collusion or subordination?

The Lebanese political and security scene gathers different stakeholders who are engaged in influence peddling feeding the chronic instability from which the Land of Cedar suffers. In this context, Hezbollah and the Lebanese Armed Forces maintain complex relations, oscillating between complementarity, collusion and subordination, according to the circumstances. By focusing on a few key questions, this Note intends to highlight the ongoing balances of power in order to evaluate the risks of arms diversion in Lebanon.

 

Jokowi’s challenges: Reforms and civil-military relations in Indonesia

Until 1998, the Indonesian armed forces were granted an institutionalized « dual function » (dwifungsi) in state operations. Through this, they had a role in the country’s security, but also politics and economy. Since Suharto’s fall, the processes of democratization and decentralization have led the civilian ship to regain the upper hand. However, the armed forces have maintained some power of influence which may question the functionality of Indonesia’s democracy. The election of Jokowi in July 2014 paved the way to new reforms that his predecessor failed to implement. Jokowi’s relation to military staff will therefore be a major stake of his term, and its evolution will be pivotal in Indonesia’s capacity to raise to the challenge of its emergence.  

Crédit photo : entraînement d’un commando de Kopassus, les forces spéciales de l'armée de terre indonésienne (source : Flickr/ Licence Creative commons)

United Arab Emirates, a hub for the smuggling to Iran

Many cases of violations of sanctions on Iran have been identified, which underpins the thesis that arms embargoes are not perfect instruments to counter the proliferation of weapons. There is evidence that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are a hub for the smuggling of weapons and other military equipment to Iran. Proliferation networks use different bypass techniques that make the detection of illegal shipments more and more difficult. This trade represents a danger to both the Gulf region and the entire world. This note aims at providing an overview of the mechanisms of diversion of sanctions against Iran in the UAE and the country’s efforts to fight against it. 

Crédit photo : Port de Jebel Ali (Source : idmifarra - Licence Creative Commons flickr)

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