1.
Executive Summary:
I.
Summary
In October 1999, a series of events began which resulted in the illegal
diversion of 3000 AK47s and 2.5 million rounds of ammunition from Nicaraguan
government stocks to the Autodefensas
Unidas de Colombia (AUC), a terrorist organization in Colombia.
The diversion was made possible by negligent actions on the part of
various government officials and private companies, and the willful and
criminal actions of several private arms merchants.
The original, legitimate, transaction was to be a trade between the
Nicaraguan National Police and a private Guatemalan arms dealership, Grupo
de Representaciones Internationales (GIR S.A.).
The Nicaraguan Army introduced GIR S.A. to the police.
GIR S.A. offered the police a quantity of new Israeli manufactured
pistols and mini-uzis in return for five thousand surplus AK47s and 2.5
million rounds of ammunition. This
was an attractive arrangement for the police since it was a cashless
transaction and would provide the police with arms more suitable for police
work.
GIR S.A. shopped for a buyer
for the police arms and settled on Shimon Yelinek, an Israeli arms merchant
based in Panama. Yelinek claimed
to be representing the Panamanian National Police, and during the negotiations
presented GIR S.A. and Nicaraguan officials with a Panamanian Police purchase
order, which has been proven to be a forgery.
Neither GIR S.A. nor any Nicaraguan official ever questioned the
purchase order or attempted to verify that Panama had in fact offered to buy
the weapons.
Yelinek inspected the police weapons some months after the deal was made,
and after Nicaraguan authorities had given permission for the transaction.
He declared them to be unserviceable and unsatisfactory.
This threatened the transaction. GIR
S.A. and the Nicaraguan Army solved the problem by arranging a swap of 5000
surplus police AK47s for 3117 serviceable weapons in the Nicaraguan Army
inventory. GIR S.A. delivered the
Israeli arms to the police and the Nicaraguan Army took over responsibility
for delivering the AK47s. Although
the parameters of the transaction changed, no new authority was requested from
responsible Nicaraguan agencies.
Yelinek identified a Panamanian maritime company, Trafalgar Maritime
Inc., to pick up the arms in Nicaragua and take them to Panama.
The arms were transported by the army to the port of El Rama,
Nicaragua, and were loaded aboard the company’s only ship, the Otterloo,
which declared for Panama. Instead,
the Otterloo sailed directly to Turbo, Colombia where the arms were delivered
to the AUC. The Captain of the
ship disappeared shortly thereafter, and the maritime company was dissolved
several months later. The
Otterloo was sold to a Colombian citizen.
Immediately after the shipment left Nicaragua, GIR S.A. began to organize
another sale to Yelinek from the Nicaraguan Army, using the same purchase
order, this time for an additional five thousand AK47s and 17 million rounds
of ammunition. Prices were
exchanged between the three, Yelinek made a down payment, and the deal was
under way.
When the diversion of the initial shipment became known, the intelligence
services of Colombia, Nicaragua and Panama agreed to organize a “sting”
operation, ostensibly to track this second shipment and identify those
responsible for the first diversion. This
plan fell apart fairly quickly when GIR S.A. found out that it was in play and
canceled the shipment.
The OAS investigative team believes that:
1.
Shimon Yelinek is likely
guilty of fraud and of violating Colombian anti-terrorism laws, and possibly
Panamanian anti-terrorism laws, among others.
An associate Marco Shrem,
appears complicit in these activities, but to an unknown degree.
2.
The owner of the Otterloo, the ship which transported the arms
to Colombia, is apparently guilty of conspiring with Yelinek to provide the
AUC with arms and of violating Colombian, and possibly Panamanian,
anti-terrorism and other laws.
3.
The captain of the ship which
transported the arms to Colombia, along with his first mate, may have been
cognizant of, and a participant in, the arms diversion organized by Yelinek.
4.
Although the Investigative
Team found no evidence that Ori Zoller and Uzi Kissilevich, the owner and
general manager of of GIR S.A., respectively, were co-conspirators in the arms
diversion, their failure to make any attempt to verify the actual destination
for the arms contributed to the diversion.
5.
The Government of Nicaragua
failed to comply with a number of provisions of the Inter-American Convention
Against the Illicit Manufacture and Trafficking in Weapons, Munitions,
Explosives and Related Materials (CIFTA), to which it is a party.
Nicaraguan authorities are guilty of professional negligence with their
failure to verify whether the Panamanian National Police was indeed the true
end-user in the arms exchange.
6.
There appears to be no
involvement of Panamanian authorities in the exchange of arms, or their
diversion.
7.
Colombia is the victim of the
arms diversion. However several
Colombian customs agents were likely accomplices of, or were bribed by, the
AUC in order to allow the Otterloo to land its cargo of arms and ammunition in
the port of Turbo.
2.
Recommendations:
The OAS Investigative Team presents below a number of recommendations to
strengthen the existing Inter-American arms control regime and prevent
diversions of this type from occurring in the future.
Recommendation 1:
The governments of Colombia, Nicaragua, and Panama should vigorously
pursue investigations into possible criminal conduct on the part of any and
all persons involved in this case, and should seek the collaboration of other
governments including Canada,
Guatemala, Israel, Mexico, and the United States of America in the
investigation and prosecution of these possible crimes.
These efforts should include attempts to
resolve the unanswered questions presented in section VII of this report.
Recommendation 2: The
Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking
in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Materials, (CIFTA), is,
and should remain, the primary multilateral hemispheric tool to prevent the
illicit manufacturing and trafficking in arms and ammunition.
All member states of the Organization who have not done so should sign
and ratify the Convention. The
Consultative Committee of CIFTA should spearhead an effort to ensure full
implementation of the Convention and to promote its full adoption.
Recommendation 3:
With regard to full implementation of the Convention, particular emphasis
should be placed on the provisions
of paragraph 3 of Article IX of the Convention, requiring evidence of the
pre-issuance of the necessary import licenses or authorizations before any
shipments of firearms are released for export.
Articles VIII, and X, should also be paid particular attention.
Member states should consider applying the CICAD Model Regulations to
facilitate implementation of the CIFTA Convention.
Recommendation 4: OAS
member states should consider establishing surplus arms destruction programs.
OAS member and observer states should provide
financial and technical assistance for such surplus arms destruction.
Recommendation 5: Persons
engaged in the import, export and in-transit movement of firearms, or as
dealers, or carriers and/or shippers of firearms, should be registered by
national governments in order to do business in each country in which they
have an office, and in each
country in which a transaction takes place.
Member states should not engage in business activities with any
non-registered broker.
Recommendation 6: All
member states should review their national legislation and administrative
practices for the exportation of firearms and establish a legal regime
sufficient to exert meaningful control over the inventory and export of
firearms.
Recommendation 7: Harmonized
import certificates should be used by all member countries. Electronic formats
of the certificates should be developed so that the information can be readily
shared with other countries involved in a transaction. Additionally,
harmonized export and in-transit documents should be developed and used by all
member states to regulate the importation, export and transit of arms and
ammunition and related materials.
The OAS Investigative Team limited its work to the specific mandate it
was given. However the
investigation revealed serious issues which the Team strongly recommends be
investigated by governments (see page 34).
2. Report of the General Secretariat of the
Organization of American States on the Diversion of Nicaraguan Arms to the
United Self Defense Forces of Colombia
I. Background:
A.
Request for an Investigation:
On May 8,
2002, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, Nicaragua and Panama,
Guillermo Fernandez de Soto, Norman Caldera C. and José Miguel Alemán,
respectively, wrote to OAS Secretary General César Gaviria.
The Ministers requested that the General Secretariat of the
Organization conduct an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the
export of an official shipment of arms and ammunition which originated in
Nicaragua in November 2001, and was subsequently diverted to the United Self
Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas
Unidas de Colombia, AUC). The
letter is contained in Annex V of this report, as document No. 17, for
reference.The Ministers
requested that the Secretary General investigate the events and report to
their respective governments setting out the facts drawn from the
investigation, together with conclusions and recommendations for suggested
mechanisms and procedures designed to prevent the recurrence of similar
situations in the future.
Given the
importance of this joint request in the post-September 11, 2001 environment,
the Secretary General responded by appointing Ambassador Morris D. Busby as
his Special Representative to lead the investigation.
B.
Investigative Task:
The general
task of the investigation was to determine how an official arms transfer
between the Nicaraguan National Police (NNP) and a firearms brokerage company
located in Guatemala, Grupo de
Representaciones Internacionales, (GIR S.A.), led to the diversion of the
Nicaraguan arms to the port of Turbo, Colombia, where the arms subsequently
came into the hands of the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas
Unidas de Colombia, AUC), a paramilitary group considered a terrorist
organization. It had been
represented to the responsible Nicaraguan authorities that the arms were being
sold and shipped to the Panamanian National Police.
The
Investigative Team undertook the following specific tasks:
1.
To determine the actual facts of the
case and prepare a complete chronology of all events pertinent to the
diversion;
2.
To develop information on possible
violations of national law and make appropriate recommendations to the
governments for follow-on investigation and/or action;
3.
To ascertain whether any of the
governments involved failed to adhere to their relevant international
obligations, and;
4.
To make appropriate recommendations to
avoid a recurrence of similar situations in the future.
C.
Methodology:
On May 28 and
29, 2002, the three governments requesting the investigation each submitted to
the General Secretariat a report on their findings related to the arms
diversion. These reports
contained facts of the case developed during their internal investigations,
and also copies of original documentation.
Based on an extensive review of this documentation, the investigating
team requested additional information from the three governments on July 15,
2002, which the governments provided in late July. Members of
the Investigative Team traveled to Nicaragua, Guatemala and Panama, to
obtain additional information and documentation, and to interview
government officials and private individuals with direct knowledge of the
case.
In Guatemala,
the team met with the owner and the general manager of the firm Grupo
de Representaciones Internacionales, (GIR S.A.), Messrs. Ori Zoller and
Uzi Kissilevich. GIR S.A. was the
broker that put together the deal.
In Nicaragua,
the team met with the Foreign Minister, the Minister of Defense, the
current and former Ministers of Government (Ministro
de Gobernación), the current and former Chiefs of Police, the Contralor General de la República, the Chief of the Nicaraguan
Army, the Inspector General of the army, several other civilian, police and
military officials, and with representatives of the Nicaraguan shipping
company, Agencia Vassali which handled the loading of the arms onto the
Otterloo for ultimate transport to Colombia. In Panama,
the team met with the Foreign Minister; the Minister of Government and Justice
(Ministro de Gobierno y Justicia);
the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs; the
Executive Secretary of the Security Council (Secretario Ejecutivo del Consejo de Seguridad); the Chief of the
Panamanian National Police; the prosecutor (Fiscal)
responsible for the case in Panama; Marco Shrem, one of two private
individuals located in Panama who were involved in the transaction; Gustavo
Padilla, a Panamanian lawyer who incorporated Trafalgar Maritime Inc.; Yariela
Brown, the Secretary of Trafalgar Maritime Inc.; Carlos Aguilar, the first
mate of the ship Otterloo, whose registered owner is Trafalgar Inc., and other
people with knowledge of the case. The
Investigative Team made several unsuccessful attempts to interview the other
private individual located in Panama who was involved in the arms diversion,
Shimon Yelinek. These attempts
were made through Yelinek's lawyers following his arrest by Panamanian
authorities in November, 2002. Table
1 (below) contains a complete list of individuals interviewed or contacted by
the Investigative Team.
The
Investigative Team did not travel to Colombia, rather, requests for
information from the Government of Colombia were made through that country’s
Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the OAS, Humberto de la Calle Lombana,
and through contacts with knowledgeable individuals. The
Investigative Team was able to reconstruct the facts surrounding the transfer
of arms from Nicaragua to Colombia based on information provided by the
countries, and other information collected during meetings with government
officials and others. The
investigation also sought, and received, information from the governments of
Belize, Guatemala, Israel, Mexico, and the United States of America.
Table1:
Persons Contacted or Interviewed by the Investigative Team
Belize:
Colombia:
-
Humberto de la Calle, Ambassador,
Permanent Representative of Colombia to the Organization of American
States.
-
Brigadier General Jose
Leonardo Gallego-Castrillon, Commander, Colombian National Police,
Valle de Aburra.
United States of America:
-
Oliver P. Garza, Ambassador of the United
States of America in Nicaragua.
-
Roger Noriega, Ambassador, Permanent
Representative of the United States of America to the Organization
of American States.
-
Christopher McMullen, Chargé, Embassy of
the United States of America in Panama.
Guatemala:
-
Ori Zoller, Owner of Grupo
de Representaciones Internacionales, GIR S.A.
-
Uzi Kissilevich, Director General of Grupo
de Representaciones Internacionales, GIR S.A.
-
Arturo Duarte, Ambassador, Permanent
Representative of Guatemala to the Organization of American States.
Israel:
-
Rafael Barak, Chargé, Embassy of Israel
in the United States of America.
-
Jacob Dayan, Alternate Permanent Observer
of Israel to the Organization of American States.
México:
Nicaragua:
-
H.E., Enrique Bolaños Geyer, President of
the Republic.
-
Norman Caldera, Minister of Foreign
Affairs.
-
Arturo Harding, Minister of Gobernación.
-
René Herrera, former
Minister of Gobernación.
-
José Adan Guerra, Minister of Defense.
-
Carlos Ulvert, Ambassador of Nicaragua to
the United States of America.
-
Leandro Marín Abaunza, Ambassador,
Permanent Representative of Nicaragua
to the Organization of American States.
-
General Javier Alonso Carrión McDonough,
Commander in Chief of the Nicaraguan
Army.
-
General Roberto Calderón, Inspector
General of the Nicaraguan Army.
-
Edwin Cordero, First Commissioner, NNP.
-
Francisco Bautista Lara, Commissioner of
Police, NNP.
-
Melby Gonzalez, Commissioner of Police,
NNP.
-
Francisco Montealegre, former First
Commissioner of Police, NNP
-
Julio César Solis, General Manager, Naval
Operations, Agencia Vassali.
-
Augusto Canales Aguilar, Owner, Agencia
Canales Aguilar.
-
Members of the Superior Council of the
Comptroller General of the Republic of Nicaragua (Consejo Superior de la Contraloría General de la Republica de
Nicaragua), including the Council's former President, Guillermo
Arguello Poessy, and its current President, Francisco Ramírez
Torres.
Panamá:
-
José Miguel Aleman, Minister of Foreign
Affairs.
-
Anibal Salas, Minister of Government and
Justice (Ministro de Gobierno
y Justicia).
-
Harmodio Arias Cerjack, Deputy Foreign
Minister.
-
Ramiro Jarvice, Executive Secretary of the
Security Council.
-
Carlos Barés, Chief of the PNP.
-
Juan Manuel Castulovich, Ambassador,
Permanent Representative of Panama
to the Organization of American States..
-
José Isaza, Chief of the Maritime Service
(Jefe del Servicio Marítimo).
-
Gustavo Leonardo Padilla Martinez,
Trafalgar Maritime Inc.'s lawyer.
-
Yariela Brown, Trafalgar Maritime Inc.'s
secretary.
-
Fredison Carvajal, PNP
-
Alexis Vergara, PNP
-
Patricio Candanedo, Second Prosecutor
Specializing in Crimes Related to Drugs, Public Ministry (Fiscal
Segundo Especializado en Delitos Relacionados con Drogas, Ministerio
Publico).
-
Marco Shrem, owner/partner, Marksman Latin
America S.A, y Marksman Panamá, commercial enterprises located in
Panama.
-
Carlos Aguilar, merchant marine captain,
first mate aboard the Otterloo.
|
The following
persons had substantive roles in the arms transaction:
In
Guatemala:
§ Ori Zoller: An
Israeli citizen and owner of GIR S.A., a firearms dealership and
brokerage agency
established in Guatemala in 1996, and a representative of Israeli Military
Industries (IMI). Zoller was formerly a member of the Israeli Army’s special
forces, and an intelligence officer.
He was the broker who organized and managed the transfer of the NNP
firearms.
§ Uzi Kissilevich:
An Israeli citizen and partner of Zoller’s in GIR S.A., also
formerly a member of the Israeli military.
He serves as GIR S.A.’s general manager and was also involved in the
NNP firearms transfer.
In
Nicaragua:
§
General Roberto Calderón
Meza: Inspector General of the
Nicaraguan Army and formerly its Chief of Logistics. Over the years, General
Calderón allegedly had a number of business dealings with Zoller. Calderón
became involved in the present case through his relationship with Zoller.
He was instrumental in providing Nicaraguan Army firearms to the NNP
when the firearms that the NNP was planning to transfer were found to be
unsatisfactory to the ultimate buyer.
§ Major Alvaro Rivas Castillo:
Major of the Nicaraguan Army, and Aide de Camp of General Calderón.
He took responsibility for logistics and the actual export of the
firearms that are the subject of the investigation.
§
René Herrera:
Nicaraguan Minister of Government (Gobernación)
until September 30, 2000. Ex-Minister
Herrera approved the terms of the transfer of the NNP firearms to GIR S.A.
Herrera also requested Nicaragua’s Comptroller General (Contraloría
General) to exempt this
firearms transaction from Nicaragua’s Law governing State Contracts (Ley de Contrataciones del Estado).
Herrera personally briefed the then United States Ambassador to
Nicaragua on the terms of the original arms deal – describing it as a sale
of antiquated arms to a broker for re-sale to collectors in the United States.
§ Commissioner Francisco
Montealegre: Chief of Police from
September 1996 to September 6, 2001. Montealegre concluded the initial arms
exchange contract with Zoller.
§ Edwin Cordero Ardilla:
Present Chief of the NNP. He
became involved in the firearms transfer following Montealgre’s retirement
and saw it through to final completion.
In Panama :
§
Shimon Yelinek:
Actual purchaser of the Nicaraguan firearms, through GIR S.A.,
purportedly for the PNP. He is an
Israeli citizen.
§
Marco Shrem:
A business associate of Yelinek. Shrem
put Yelinek in contact with Zoller,
collaborated with Yelinek in the purchase of the Nicaraguan firearms through
Zoller, and attempted to buy/sell additional arms though Zoller.
He is a Peruvian citizen.
§ Miguel Onattopp Ferriz:
General Manager and owner of Trafalgar Martime Inc., the company identified as
the registered owner of the Otterloo. The
Otterloo loaded the arms in El Rama, Nicaragua, and transported them to
Colombia. Miguel Onattopp Ferriz
is a Mexican citizen.
§ Jesús Iturrios Maciel:
Captain of the Otterloo at the time of the diversion, employed by
Trafalgar Maritime Inc. He is a Mexican citizen.
Annex
II contains a complete listing of all of the natural and legal persons and
other entities involved in the case.
III. The Chain of
Events:
The chain of events of the case can be broken down into the following
four phases:
§ The first phase, from October
1999 to June 2000, begins when the Chief of the NNP, Commissioner Francisco
Montealegre, aware that his police force has insufficient and inappropriate
firearms and a lack of financial resources to acquire new ones, is introduced
to Ori Zoller of GIR S.A. by the Inspector General of Nicaragua’s army,
General Roberto Calderón. A
proposed arms transfer was conceived whereby the NNP would provide a quantity
of AK47 firearms to the broker Zoller, and in exchange, Zoller would provide
the NNP with more suitable firearms (pistols and mini-Uzis). During this stage, the necessary approvals within the
Nicaraguan Government were sought and obtained, and a formal contract to
effect the exchange was entered into between the
NNP and Zoller’s GIR S.A.
§ The second phase occurred
between July 2000 and July 2001, when Zoller identified a buyer for the
Nicaraguan arms, Shimon Yelinek and his associates. A shipping company was established in Panama, Trafalgar
Maritime Inc., apparently for the purpose of transporting the arms to the AUC
in Colombia. It was during this
stage that the arms diversion appears to have been planned.
§ During the third phase,
between July 4, 2001 and November 3, 2001, there was a flurry of activity,
beginning when Yelinek inspected the NNP arms being offered for sale by Zoller
and determined that their condition was not adequate for the transaction to
proceed. In an attempt to salvage
the transaction, Zoller and
General Calderón entered into an agreement whereby the Nicaraguan Army
offered to exchange the unacceptable NNP arms for better quality ones in the
army’s possession. This was
also the period when the final logistical arrangements and customs and export
procedures were executed, and culminated with the arms and ammunition being
exported from Nicaragua and diverted to Colombia.
§ The fourth and final phase took place from late
November 2001 to February 2002, when
preparations were made to purchase a second shipment of arms from Nicaragua,
again ostensibly for the Panamanian Police.
The intelligence services of Colombia, Panama, and Nicaragua, through a
tri-national operation, proposed by the Nicaraguan Armny, attempted to put
together a “sting”, supposedly to uncover those responsible for the
diversion.
Narrative
Summary of the Chain of Events:
The narrative presented below was reconstructed from interviews and
documents obtained by the Investigative Team.
A documented chronology of events is presented in Annex I which
provides additional details regarding the events surrounding the diversion,
and the persons, institutions, and businesses involved.
Phase I
The Nicaraguan National Police, a force
consisting of approximately 7000 police officers, has only about half the
number of side-arms necessary to equip every officer. This has forced the police to issue AK47 assault rifles to
many officers, these arms being plentiful as they were left over from
Nicaragua’s civil war. The
Police leadership recognizes that AK47s are not appropriate for a police
force. In 1999, General Roberto Calderón, the Inspector General of the
Nicaraguan Army, introduced the Chief of the NNP, Commissioner Francisco
Montealegre, to Ori Zoller, the owner of GIR S.A. Zoller and Calderón had a prior business relationship, as
GIR S.A. had sold arms and equipment to the Nicaraguan military in the past.
In the fall of 1999, Zoller presented Montealegre with a proposal to
obtain suitable side arms which would not require the NNP to pay cash for the
arms.
Zoller and Montealegre worked out an exchange,
whereby GIR S.A. would provide the NNP with new side arms (465 Jericho pistols
and 100 Uzi-submachineguns) in exchange for aging surplus police AK47s,
ammunition and bayonets (initially, 5000 AK47s, 2.5 million rounds of
ammunition, and 6000 bayonets).
Between February and the end of May, 2000, various bureaucratic
procedures were undertaken within the Nicaraguan Government to obtain approval
for the exchange of arms. The
exchange was approved by the Minister of Gobernación,
who has responsibility for the NNP; it was also approved by the President of
the Republic (as mentioned in a February 3, 2000 letter from the Minister of Gobernación,
see document No. 156 in Annex V). An
exemption to the state purchases Law, to allow for a “sole source”
transaction of the arms, was approved by the Comptroller General on May 22. The Minister of Gobernación
also informed the United States Embassy in Managua of the possible exchange,
as Zoller originally indicated he would sell the AK47s as collectors items to
a broker in the United States, Century International Arms.
While these internal procedures were being followed, Montealegre and
Zoller formalized the agreement by jointly signing a letter of intent,
outlining the terms under which the exchange was to be made.
Once the various approvals were obtained for the exchange, Zoller and
Montealegre signed a formal contract on June 2, 2000.
Among other clauses in the contract was a requirement for Zoller to
produce an end-user certificate for the Nicaraguan arms to be exported. Meanwhile, in order to make the maximum cash profit on the exchange,
Zoller was searching for
buyers for the military equipment. He
found three potential buyers for the arms:
1) Brian Sucher, of Century International Arms Inc., based in Miami,
Florida; 2) Pedro Bello, another
Miami-based arms broker; and 3) Shimon
Yelinek, an Israeli citizen residing in Panama. Shimon Yelinek was introduced to Zoller by Marco Shrem, another resident
of Panama, and an associate of Yelinek.
Zoller’s business partner, Uzi Kissilevich, had been informed by Haim
Geri, an advisor to Century International Arms Inc. and former representative
of Israeli Military Industries in Colombia, that Marco Shrem was seeking to
purchase AK47s. Once Kissilevich
contacted Shrem, and the latter introduced Yelinek, it was only a short time
before Zoller and Yelinek reached a deal, as the latter apparently offered
Zoller the best price for the Nicaraguan arms and ammunition.
Yelinek and Shrem purported to be acting as brokers or middlemen for the
Panamanian National Police, which was allegedly the entity ultimately
interested in purchasing the arms and ammunition. Yelinek, Shrem,
Zoller, and Yelinek’s brother in law, Haviv Aviad, traveled to Nicaragua on
April 28, 2000, to inspect the arms that the Nicaraguan National Police was to
provide as part of the exchange. On
May 18, Zoller traveled to Panama to meet Yelinek and Shrem.
Yelinek agreed to purchase 2500 AK47s (later increased to 3000) and 2.5
million rounds of ammunition (later increased to 5 million rounds).
Zoller agreed to have the NNP arms reconditioned and crated, a task
which was contracted to the NNP and associates of General Calderón.
That same day, Zoller instructed Kissilevich to fax to Panama GIR S.A.’s
bank account information so Yelinek could make a down-payment for the arms
purchase. On June 16, $75,000 was
deposited in GIR S.A.’s account, via wire transfer.
The total value of the Zoller-Yelinek deal was approximately $575,000.
Phase II
Over the next several months, Yelinek and Shrem solicited additional
price quotes from GIR S.A. for firearms, missiles and other kinds of military
equipment. At the same time, GIR
S.A. sent a series of reminders and instructions to Yelinek as to how to send
wire-transfers to GIR S.A.’s bank account.
On May 15, 2001, Yelinek met Zoller at his offices in Guatemala City,
where he provided Zoller with an alleged Panamanian Police purchase order, which specified a much larger quantify of arms and ammunition.
The purchase order included language which could allow the order to be
used simultaneously as an end-user certificate.
Yelinek inspected the NNP arms in Nicaragua a
second time (this time in the presence of Uzi Kissilevich, Zoller’s
associate) on July 4, 2001. As
a result of this inspection, at some point in July or August of 2001, Yelinek
indicated to GIR S.A. that the police arms were of poor quality and did not
meet his requirements. Zoller
quickly corrected this problem by making a side deal with the army through
General Calderón, whereby the army agreed to accept the NNP’s 5000 old
AK47s, in return for 3117 new AK47s in the possession of the army.
As a result, these new army weapons would then be the arms exchanged
with GIR S.A. under the original contract signed between the NNP and GIR S.A.
In a further modification of the original deal, the Nicaraguan Army
also agreed to provide an additional 2.5 million bullets and 3000 additional
bayonets; GIR S.A. agreed to provide the army with a number of bullet-proof
vests. Zoller also hired Haim
Geri to train the police on their new weapons.
Two side-deals were also arranged by Zoller.
One hundred fifteen of the guns supplied by the Nicaraguan Army, were
to be sold to the Guatemalan Military. Nine
thousand bayonets were to be sold to Century International Arms, Inc, in
Miami. From the perspective of
laws on international arms trafficking, both of these two side-deals appear to
be legitimate.
Virtually at the same time, on July 11, 2001, a Mexican National, Miguel
Onattopp Ferriz, reportedly a Captain in the Mexican Merchant Marine,
established a new shipping company in Panama City, Trafalgar Maritime Inc.,
through a Panamanian lawyer, Gustavo Padilla.
The company’s only ship, the Otterloo, had been purchased from Dutch
owners in early July 2001, and was given a provisional Panamanian ship’s
license on July 24.
Phase III
All of the arrangements necessary to export the
arms and ammunition were coordinated between the Nicaraguan Army, which
undertook this role on behalf of the NNP, GIR S.A.’s shipping agent,
Guatemala-based Leonel Cordon, a shipping agent in Nicaragua, Agencia Vassali
S.A., and a customs broker, hired by the police, Agencia Aduanera Canales Aguilar.
By the end of October, 2001, GIR S.A. had
virtually fulfilled its side of the bargain with the NNP, providing all but
five of the side-arms stipulated in the original contract with the police.
By the middle of the month, Yelinek had wire-transferred to GIR S.A.
approximately $550,000, which was only $25,000 short of the total owed.
The logistical aspects had also largely been arranged, and the arms and
ammunition were ready to be exported.
On October 19, 2001, Yelinek informed Zoller that the arms and
ammunition were to be transported on a Panamanian-flagged vessel, the
Otterloo, owned by Panamanian-based Trafalgar Maritime Inc, whose
representative was Miguel Onattopp Ferriz.
On October 22, 2001, Police Commissioner Edwin Cordero Ardilla notified
the Contraloría General of the
quantitative change in the arrangement with GIR S.A., and also the army-police
arms exchange. The Otterloo sailed from Veracruz, Mexico, on
October 15. Before sailing, the
captain of the Otterloo, Iturrios Maciel,
provided Mexican authorities with a signed Bill of Lading in which he
stipulated that his ship was transporting 9 containers of plastic balls to
Panama. The Otterloo
arrived at the Nicaraguan port of El Rama on November 26.
After a delay of several days, on November 2, 2001, the Otterloo was
loaded with 14 containers of arms and ammunition. The Otterloo’s captain signed a ship manifest and a Bill of
Lading stating that the ship had been loaded with the 14 containers and that
the ship’s destination was the port of Colón, Panama. The Otterloo left Nicaragua on November 3, 2001. On November 5, 2001, the Otterloo arrived at the
port of Turbo, on Colombia’s Caribbean coast, without ever having stopped in
Panama. The ship was unloaded two
days later by a Colombian shipping company called Banadex S.A., at the request
of a shipping agent Turbana Ltd. The
Otterloo sailed for Baranquilla on November 9, where the Captain, Jesus
Iturrios Maciel disembarked, stating he was ill, and disappeared.
After a series of other stops, the Otterloo returned to Panama.
In April 2002 Trafalgar Maritime, Inc. was
dissolved and the Otterloo was sold to a Colombian citizen, Edgar Enrique
Aaron Villalba (see document No. 11, Annex III).
The Investigative Team was informed that the new owner may have
registered the ship in Belize. However,
the Government of Belize has not been able to find the vessel in its registry,
the International Merchant Marine Registry of Belize.
A
final footnote to this arms diversion was provided by the leader of the United
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, Carlos Castaño, On June 30, 2002, in an
interview granted to Colombia’s newspaper, El Tiempo, he answered a
question about the Otterloo, and
said “This is the greatest achievement by the AUC so far. Through Central America, five shipments, 13 thousand rifles”,
(see document No. 14a in Annex V).
Phase
IV
Almost immediately after the Otterloo unloaded
its cargo in Turbo, a second, larger arms sale began to be organized by
Zoller, at the request of Yelinek, also allegedly for the Panamanian National
Police. On November 21, Zoller
sent a fax to the Nicaraguan Army, explaining that the PNP wished to purchase
an additional 5000 AK47s and 17 million rounds of ammunition.
He attached a copy of the same Panamanian purchase order, dated
February 10, 2000. Zoller began
making arrangements with his shipping agent to purchase 23 containers for this
second shipment of arms. A
January 3, 2002, fax from Kissilevich to Leonel Cordon informed Cordon that
the containers should be sent to the Nicaraguan Army in Managua, and that the
contact person was General Calderon’s aide, Major Rivas.
On January 11, 2002, the Nicaraguan Army issued a bill for $980,000
addressed to the PNP. On January 16, 2002, Yelinek wire-transfered $50,000 to GIR
S.A’s account as a down-payment.
Towards the end of January, 2002, Colombian
authorities became aware that the AUC had received the Nicaraguan arms, and
informed the Panamanian Naval Intelligence Service, who in turn informed the
Nicaraguan Army on January 30, 2002.
This put into motion a three-nation effort on the part of Colombian,
Panamanian and Nicaraguan intelligence services. Representatives of
the three services met in Managua in early February, and on February 6, signed
an agreement called “Operation Triangle” (Operación
Triangulo), described as a “sting” operation to catch the arms
traffickers, utilizing the second deal being organized by Zoller (See Annex V,
document No. 24). The NNP was not informed by the Nicaraguan Army that the
arms they had exchanged had been diverted to Colombia, nor were they included
in Operación Triangulo.
Zoller, in an interview with the Investigative
Team, said that on or about February 15, 2002, he decided to stop the second
deal when General Calderón informed him of Operación Triangulo.
He notified Julio Solis of Agencia
Vassali as well as his own agent, Leonel Cordon, that he no longer needed
the containers. General Calderón
told the OAS Investigating Team that Zoller knew nothing about Operación
Triangulo.
IV. Analysis:
Although it was not the purpose of this investigation to uncover
wrongdoing on the part of any specific individual, governments may wish to
probe further into the facts to determine if their national laws have been
violated. The following provides
the Investigative Team’s own perspective.
As a general comment, the Team would note that
although a great deal of interest and attention to detail is evident in the
movement of the firearms out of Nicaragua, Zoller, Kissilevich and the others
involved readily accepted the bogus Panamanian purchase order, and displayed a
complete lack of interest as to where the arms were ultimately going.
There is no record of any communications between GIR S.A. and the
Panamanian Police Force or any other Panamanian authority. Nothing in the
evidence indicates that Zoller, Kissilevich, or any of the many Nicaraguan
officials involved ever attempted to verify whether the purchase order
provided by Yelinek was legitimate. As well, to rely on this one purchase
order, unsupported by any other documentation
throughout this complex transaction, and to utilize this one document
as determinative of the identity of the end-user, is unprofessional and not
credible. This matter becomes
even more damning considering that a second, larger, shipment was planned for
the same alleged customer immediately on the heels of the first shipment.
Again, no efforts were made by anyone involved to contact Panamanian
authorities, even though it is difficult to understand why the Panamanian
Police Force would purchase upwards of 8000 AK47s and 22 million rounds of
ammunition when the entire force consists of only 13,000 officers, including
administrative staff, and when the NNP leadership had recognized that AK47s
were unfit for police work.
(1) The brokers and shippers
Messrs. Zoller and Kissilevich of GIR S.A. in
Guatemala, Yelinek and Shrem in Panama, Onattopp Ferriz, the owner of the
shipping company Trafalgar Maritime Inc., and Iturrios Maciel, the captain of
the Otterloo, are the persons most closely linked to the diversion.
Yelinek, situated in Panama, appears
consistently at the heart of the matter.
He provided Zoller with the Panamanian purchase order on which the sale
of the Nicaraguan firearms was based. He
inspected the NNP arms, pronounced
them unfit and with Zoller set in train the substitution of army firearms.
Yelinek paid GIR S.A. for the arms and provided GIR S.A. the name of the
Otterloo, communicated the particulars about the company that owned it, and
the name of its legal representative. Yelinek departed Panama in April 2002,
shortly after the diversion became public, and reappeared only in mid-November
2002, when he was arrested by Panamanian authorities on suspicion of arms
trafficking. His abrupt departure
from Panama following the publicizing of the original diversion seems to
indicate that he did not wish to be present to be investigated in any possible
proceeding. At the time
this report was published, Yelinek was still in Panamanian custody.
Onatopp Ferriz established Trafalgar Maritime
Inc. in early July 2001, purchased the Otterloo, registered it in Panama and
obtained its provisional Certificate of Navigation from the Panamanian
authorities. Coincident with the
timing of Yelinek’s departure from Panama, the offices of Trafalgar closed
in April 2002. Onatopp Ferriz
also disappeared from Panama around the same time.
The captain of the Otterloo, Iturrios Maciel,
signed the cargo manifest and Bill of Lading, both of which falsely indicate
that the final destination of the arms was the port of Colón, Panama.
Iturrios Maciel also signed the Acta de Salida form of Nicaragua’s
Ministerio de Gobernación, again falsely declaring his departure to Colón
and stating the same destination to the Nicaraguan navy.
Two days later, confirmation of the Otterloo’s arrival at Turbo,
Colombia was evidenced by Iturrios’ signature on a Colombian Departamento
Administrativo de Seguridad form. The
Otterloo then proceeded to Barranquilla where Iturrios disembarked and
disappeared.
Ori Zoller and Uzi Kissilevich coordinated of
all the activities associated with the sale of the Nicaraguan arms.
They put all of the deals together and had on-going contacts with many
Nicaraguan officials including NNP Commissioner Montealegre, his successor,
Commissioner Cordero, their subordinates, with General Calderón, Major Rivas
and other army officers. In addition GIR S.A. seems to have had undue
influence over internal Nicaraguan aspects of the transfer considering that
they are civilians and foreigners. They
were the link to Shrem, Yelinek, Haim Geri and others, and had extensive
dealings involving this and other potential firearms transactions, as well as
proposed arms transactions after the diversion.
They accepted the fraudulent Panamanian Police purchase order from
Yelinek and provided it to Nicaraguan authorities for both the original deal,
as well as the potential second arms sale.
For experienced arms brokers, at best, Zoller and Kissilevich exhibited
negligence and perhaps willful blindness over this part of the transaction.
(2) The Nicaraguan
Authorities
(a)
The NNP and
Nicaraguan Civilian Authorities
The
initial proposed exchange of the NNP’s obsolete weapons to Zoller in
exchange for new ones appears to have been conducted in a transparent fashion.
NNP Commissioner Montealegre’s January 2000 correspondence to Minister
Herrera seeking his approval of the letter of intent to effect the exchange
with GIR S.A,. and the need to obtain an end-use certificate as a part of the
transaction are evidence of this. Herrera
also told Commissioner Montealegre of the need to submit the proposal to the
Contaloría. This was required
because the acquisition of the new arms from GIR S. A. was
considered a government purchase which, pursuant to Article 3 (k) of
the Ley
de Contrataciones del Estado
